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ERISA, PREEMPTION AND
COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL HEALTH
CARE: A CALL FOR "COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM" TO PRESERVE
THE STATES' ROLE IN FORMULATING
HEALTH CARE POLICY
JAMES

E.

HOLLOWAY*

With the dominance of federal medical care and the exclusivity of federal employee benefit regulation, the passage of comprehensive federal health care regulation, which establishes uniform
and consistent administration of medical care, significantly
threatens to interfere with state powers to develop innovative
health care and to promote their public policy. This interference,
in turn, would signal the decline of American federalism. Many
commentators and government officials believe that a comprehensive federal health care policy will reform the nation's health care
delivery system. 1 Although such reform is likely, its preemptive
effects could be constitutionally damaging for two predominant
reasons. First, the federal government must retain and exercise
final regulatory authority over much state health care and other
policy to establish uniform and consistent regulation of medical
care. Second, the federal government already retains and exer-

* James E. Holloway, Associate Professor, Business Law, Department of
Finance, School of Business, El;lst Carolina University, Greenville, North
Carolina 27858; B.S., North Carolina A & T State University, 1972; M.B.A., East
Carolina University, 1984; J.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
1983.
1. Mary Anne Boblinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1990); J.
Geisel, Delays, Politics May Hobble Health Reform, Bus. INS., May 10, 1993, at
57; J.B. Kenny & Sean Sullivan, Health Care Reform: National, State and Local
Direction, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J., June 1993, at 41.
Many causes have been put forth to explain the crisis of the national health
care delivery system. See Christine Woolsey, Doctol' the Patient Is Critical, Bus.
INS., Oct. 30, 1992, at 20. Woolsey finds that the health care crisis was caused by
several factors: the aging of the population, medical technology, poverty, medical
malpractice, the capitalistic health care system, AIDS, and government
intervention. Id. at 20-22. In addition, Woolsey finds that doctors, hospitals,
lawyers, and insurance companies must bear much of the blame. Id. at 23-25.
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cises final authority under employee benefit policy which presently preempts much state health care policy. In maintaining a
consistent and uniform statutory framework which provides
access to, compensates for, and insures the quality of health care,
a comprehensive federal health care regulation could eventually
preempt much state law and public policy (i.e., state health care,
health care-related, tort, insurance, employment, and contract
laws).2 Therefore, national health care regulation could preempt
more state law and public policy than regulations addressing
employee benefit policy, which continue to decrease the scope of
federalism. 3
This article revisits the familiar theme of federalism and
health care policy. It takes the position that federalism is decreasing and will decrease further under national health care that is
fast becoming, if not already so, an exclusive field of federal regulation. 4 The article draws this conclusion from three influences on
federal regulation and policy: (1) the expanding preemptive
effects of employee benefit regulation on state health care, as well
as other law and public policy; (2) the increasing public policy
favoring a comprehensive national health care policy; and (3) the
existing dominance of federal medical care and assistance regulation in the field of health care. The article is a comment on the
preemptive effect that federal employee benefit regulation pres-

2. See Rick Wartzman & Hillary Stout, Clinton Health Plan Push
Competition to be Ready to Regulate: Comprehensive Care Scheme Will Set
Terms of a Battle Not Soon to Be Resolved-Strong Arm of Government , WALL
ST. J., Sept. 13, 1993, at Al (stating that Clinton's comprehensive proposal
extends the power of government and permits it to reach in some narrow places).
For discussion of the expansive preemptive effects of a comprehensive federal
health care policy on state law, see generally infra notes 203-14 and
accompanying text (listing potential state fields of law and public policy that
would be preempted, in whole or part, by a comprehensive health care policy).
3. Mark A. Hofmann & Meg Fletcher, Reform Plan Takes Shape, Bus. INS.,
May 17, 1993, at 1 ("including medical elements of workers comp, auto cover in
system raises concerns"); Meg Fletcher, Work Compo Insurers Oppose Removing
Medical Care From State System, Bus. INS., May 17, 1993, at 24; see also Geisel,
supra note 1, at 1.
4. This article does not challenge the importance of national health care'. It
seeks to heighten the debate regarding the constitutional dangers of a
comprehensive federal health care policy. It observes that such a policy's effect
on state law and public policy could eventually be broader than anticipated and
thus threaten federalism.
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ently has on state health care law and public policy.5 In addition,
5. One example of a comprehensive federal health care plan is the proposal
offered by the current Feder,aIAdministration. AMERICAN HEALTH SECURITY ACT
OF 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). It is used as an example in this
artiCle to illustrate how comprehensive federal health care policy could
eventually affect state-federal relations a:nd thus undermine federalism through
lessening states' powers. Most likely, other comprehensive policies will have
similar advantages and disadvantages to the current Federal Administration's
proposal. There are enough plans, with more to come, such as THE HEALTH
SECURITY ACT, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (the Clinton Plim); HEALTH
EQUITY AND ACCESS' REFORM TODAY ACT, H.R. 3652, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993)
(the Chafee-Dole plan); AMERICAN HEALTH SECURITY ACT, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1993) (the Wellstone-McDermott plan); and AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE
Now ACT, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (the Hous.e Republican
Approach). See gener:allyJohn Harwood, Rival,Plans Gain Strength But None
Claim Majority , WALL ST. J ., Oct. 28, 1993, at A18. One thing is definitee~eryone seems to have a plan, but no one seems to have a solution. Thus, this
article will use the current Federal Administration's plan to illustrate both
immediate and long-term constitutional concerns regarding the impact of
comprehensive federal health care regulation. on federalism and states' rights.
In September 1993, the current Federal Administration released its
proposed n~tional health care reform. ,The reform proposal is called The
American Health Security Act (hereinafter Health Security Proposal). See The
White House Domestic P~lic'y Council, THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT: THE
PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN 3, 1993 (Introduction by Erik Eckholm of
The New York Times) (hereinafter President's Health Plan). The Health
Security Proposal offers health care coverage to each American, by providing a
comprehensive package of health care benefits. These benefits are purchased by
regional health alliances that are operated by the states. These alliances
purchase health benefits from local health plans within the states. Id. at x. The
"Comprehensive Benefits [are defined as] [g]uaranteed benefits [that] should
meet the full range of health ' needs, including primary, preventive and
specialized care. Id. at ii.
It has been noted that the "[current Federal Administration's] proposal gives
states considerable flexibility but envisions the federal government in a strong
'supervisory role." Edwin Chen & Robert A. Rosenblatt, Health Plan Casts Wide
Net , THE NEWS AND OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 1993, at 1A (Authors are reporters for
Los Angeles Times.). Under the Health Security Proposal, the federal
government ·,establishes minimum standards, while the states can implement
their own plans. If, however, the states fail to implement a plan, the federal
government will do .so. The Health Security PI'oposal imposes an health care tax
on employers ' which makes health care benefits a mandatory employer
obligation. Furthermore, under the Health Security Proposal, individuals must
pay a portion oftheir health care cost. For those individuals that cannot afford to
pay f~r their health care, the Health Security Proposal provide~ for a government
subsidy. The Health Security Proposal also requires individuals and some
employers ' to enroll in state regulated health care plans through regional or
corporate alliances. President's Health Plan, supra, at xi-xvi.
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the article discusses the preemptive effect that comprehensive federal health care could eventually have on state law, public policy,
and health care regulations.
The article begins by examining government obligations for,
and federal regulation of, health care under the United States
Constitution. It discusses federal medical assistance and
employee benefit policies as well as state health care law and public policy. Part II examines the extent to which employee benefit
regulation preempts state common law, insurance regulation, and
other law. In addition, Part II discusses the exceptions to and
exemptions from preemption under employee benefit regulation.
Part III examines the preemption of specific state health care regulation by federal employee benefit regulation. Specifically, it
analyzes federal court cases which addressed the issue of whether
federal employee benefit regulation preempts state health care
law. Part IV, using employee benefit regulation as an example of
a comprehensive regulatory model, discusses the scope of federalism under employee benefit and proposed national health care policies. Part V discusses the expansive preemption of state law
needed to establish uniform and consistent regulation of the
administration of health care. In addition, it comments on the
shared health care responsibilities of the state and federal governments under federalism. The article concludes by finding that the
dominance of the federal regulation in the field of medical care,
coupled with the expansive preemptive effects of both national
health care and employee benefit policy, severely limit the states'
powers to establish comprehensive health care policy. Such limitations accelerate the decline of federalism by restricting the
states' ability to concern themselves with local medical care needs
and to use local employment-based resources in formulating a
comprehensive state health care policy.

A.

On October 27, 1993, the current Federal Administration presented to
Congress the Health Security Act (hereinafter Presented Health Security Act).
Commerce Clearinghouse, President Clinton's Health Care Reforms Proposal:
Health Security Act as Presented to Congress on October 27, 1993, CCH
Professional Summary and Text of Bill) (1993) (hereinafter Clinton's Health
Care Reform). The Presented Health Security Act contains 11 titles that
introduce and implement health care reform. "In addition, the White House has
indicated that numerous technical con-ections to this version of the legislation
will be added when the bill is actually introduced." Id. at 3.
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HEALTH CARE: THE GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATION
AND POLICY
-,

During the last thirty years, the federal government has
enacted two major medical assistance programs and reluctantly
pursued national health 'care ' programs. 6 On the other hand,
states have enacted health care legislation to increase access to,
control the cost of, and pay for medical care and services. 7 At the
same time, federal courts were finding that much state health
care policy was preempted by federal employee benefit policies. 8
The expansive preemption of state health care law by employee
benefit policy, along with a lack of proposals for permitting states
to develop their health care reform, suggests an eventual constitutional conflict regarding limitations on the exercise of powers by
states under a comprehensive federal health care regulation.
Such a conflict would signal a further decline in the scope of federalism. Federalism declines when states are not permitted to make
comprehensive state health care policy that: (1) freely uses federal resources; (2) broadly relies upon private sources of revenues;
(3) directly mandates employment-based obligations; and (4) truly
reflects state and local public policy.
A.

The Influence of Federal Health Care Policy

Federal employee benefit regulation and federal medical care
regulation significantly__influence existing state law and public
policy. Federal medical care regulation permits the federal government to dominate the field of health care. Currently, federal
medical care regulation consists mostly of social insurance and
means-tested medical care arid assistance programs. Federal regulation provides medical insurance to aged and disabled citizens
and subsidizes medical assistance to indigent children and their
families. 9 Federal medical care regulation also permits limited
state participation in health care administration and asks states
6. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 340.
7. Michael S. Ackerman, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Care Law and
Worker Well-Being, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 825 (1981); Boblinski, supra note 1, at
299-305; M.K. Keefe, Three States Focus on Reform at Home, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PLAN REV., July 1993, at 38, 38-43; Bill Would Authorize Implementation of
Health Care Reform At The State Level, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., Nov.
1992, at 52, 53 (hereafter Authorize Implementation); see also infra notes 179180 and accompanying text.
8. Infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
9. Infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
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to establish health assistance programs in order to gain federal
funds. Nevertheless, federal health care regulation is a patchwork of annual legislative amendments, lately affected by federa,l
budget deficit reduction.
Employee health care benefits plans are regulated by federal
employee benefit regulation, which is known as the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 197410 (hereinafter ERISA).
ERISA regulates, inter alia, the administration of employee
health care benefits l l and provides a regulatory framework for the
adminisration of employee benefit plans among the states. 12 The
uniformity and consistency created by this framework justifies, as
recognized by Congress and the Supreme Court, the invalidation
of much state law and public policy.13 For those reasons, state
officials, commentators, and scholars argue that ERISA goes too
far.14 Specifically, they argue that the broad interpretation of
ERISA's preemption clause, as contained in section 1144(a),15 prevents states from exercising their police and other powers to
establish a comprehensive state health care policy.16 Although
such an interpretation greatly decreases states' legislative means
to increase access to or pay for health care needs, federal courts
have consistently concluded that much state health care and
health care-related regulations "relate to"17 ERISA-covered

empl
inter
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10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
12. See infra notes 48-62 ~hd accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1602 and H.R. 2782: Bills Relating to ERISA's
Preemption of Certain State Laws, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1991) (hearing before
the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on
Education and Labor House of Representative); Ackerman, supra note 7, at 86467; Boblinski, supra note 1, at 258-59; Laura J. Bond, Note, ERISA-Preemption:
Congress's Cue to Reassess ERISA's Preemption Effect, 36 RAN. L. REV. 611, 61125 (1988); Junda Woo, Benefits Law Hurts Some It Aimed to Help, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 1993, at B1; Authorize Implementation, supra note 7, at 52-53 (Senate
Bill 1380 to amend ERISA).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). This section provides:
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and
not exempt under 1003(b). This section shall take effect on January 1,
1975.
Id.
16. See supra note 14; see also infra notes 99-177 and accompanying text.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
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employee benefit plans. As a result, these state health care laws
interfere with the consistent and uniform regulation of the administration of employee benefit plans as intended by Congress. 18
Thus, both the required compliance with federal subsidized medical assistance regulation and the broad preemptive effects of
employee benefit regulation severely limit the content and
enforceability of state health care policy.
B.

The Federal and State Health Care Obligation

In examining the preemption of state health care policy and
its impact on federalism, a critical question is whether the government has an enforceable obligation to provide and secure health
care. If government has no obligation to secure health care, then
governmental health care programs provide temporary benefits
which may not be a legitimate state concern. But if a governmental obligation does exist, the issue becomes whether the state or
federal government is responsible for that obligation under federalism's sharing of power. Thus, in analyzing the preemptive
effects that employee benefit and national health care policies
have on state law and public policy, two fundamental points need
to be considered. First, whether government has an obligation to
provide and secure health care for its citizens. And second, if government has this obligation, which government(s) in our federalist
system should have an "affirmative obligation" to provide and
secure health care for its citizens? Presently, the federal government provides health care insurance to the aged and disabled,
while state governments implement health care programs and
provide federally subsidized medical assistance to the needy.19
1.

Government Responsibility for Medical Care

The former question, whether government has the duty to
provide and secure health care, requires consideration first
because if government has no health care responsibility then federal and state health care programs are not interminable obligations. While there has been much discussion about whether
government has a public obligation, there is no agreement.
Although few states have recognized an individual's right to medical care, most have voluntarily established medical care assist18. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

7

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4

412

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:405

ance programs for parts of the general population. 20 However,
federal courts have generally held that individuals do not have a
constitutional right to receive federal or state medical care. 21 In
Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of
the State in the Framing ERA, 22 Professor Parmet discussed public health law and political theories and concluded that government has an obligation to provide health care to its citizens. 23
Furthermore, Professor Parmet found that the Framers could
have intended health care to be a state obligation, as opposed to
federal. It is beyond the scope of this article to articulate a rationale for or against government responsibility for providing health
care to its citizens. At this time, the federal and state governments are performing a health care role and seem unlikely to give
it up or to expand it rapidly.

20. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 306 n.174. Many states have established
statutory and constitutional provisions that provide medical assistance to the
poor. Michael A. Dowell, State and Local Government Legal Responsibilities to
Provide Medical Care for the Poor, 3 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 3-7 (1988-89). Moreover,
several states have begun to establish various types of health care programs for
their citizens who cannot afford to purchase either health care or health care
insurance .. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
21. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (no constitutional right to have an abortion funded);
Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987)
(no duty based on either the federal constitution or statutes to require states or
counties to provide medical care for the medically indigent); Elloit v. Enrlich, 280
N.W.2d 637, 641 (Neb. 1979) (welfare benefits are not fundamental rights and
neither the state nor the federal government are under any constitutional
obligation to guarantee the minimum levels of support).
22. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and
the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 267, 319-30
(1993).
Some students of health care policy did not believe that states would provide
effective health care programs. Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health
Care Policy: States and the Old Question, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 647, 64748 (1986). Others believe that a comprehensive federal health care program
could exceed federal authority. See David Rivkin, Health Care Reform v. The
Founders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1993, at A19 ("If the legality of a health care
package featuring federally mandated universal participation is litigated and the
system is upheld, it will mark the final extension of an originally modest grant of
federal authority.").
23. Parmet, supra note 22, at 319-30.
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Federal Responsibility for Medical Care

During the last three decades, the federal government established two major medical care and assistance programs. One of
these programs is Health Insurance for the Aged,24 a federal
social insurance program better known as Medicare. Medicare
consists of two insurance programs: (1) Part A-Hospital Insur··
ance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled,25 and (2) Part B- Supplementing Medical Insurance Benefits For the Aged and
Disabled. 26 Under both Parts A and B, individuals less than 65
years of age are not permitted to enroll in Medicare unless they
are disabled. 27
The other major federal program is Grants to States for Medical Assistance Program,28 is better known as Medicaid. Medicaid
is a state health care assistance program subsidized by the federal
government. 29 Medicaid provides medical assistance for the poor,
disabled and aged, as well as minor dependent children and their
parents. 30 The states establish minimum eligibility and medical
service standards that must be consistent with federal guidelines. 31 However, federal Medicare and Medicaid do not necessarily mean that constitutional authority rests with the federal
government for providing and securing health care for the states
and their citizens. Perhaps it just took the initiative, or the
power.
Moreover, the expansive preemptive effect of employee benefit
regulation does not mean that the federal government' has a constitutional health care obligation. During the past three decades,
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396d (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. III 1991).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395; (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Medicare does not
preempt state administrative regulations that regulate the billing and amount
physicians and hospitals charge patients receiving medical care and assistance
under Medicare. See Medical Soc'y v. Cuomo, 976 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1992); New
York State Soc'y of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Gould, 796 F. Supp. 67
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684 (D.
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).
One federal court referred to the state regulation of billings and costs as
"cooperative federalism." See also Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 140 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
30.Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1346a (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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Congress has steadfastly refused to enact a comprehensive health
care program for the nation. 32 Due to this inaction by Congress,
the contents of employee benefit plans are still based upon free
contract, not federal employee benefit regulation. Any relationship between health care policy and welfare benefit policy was created in the 1940s and 1950S33 by employer's programs to recruit
and retain employees. 34 Under ERISA and other employee benefit
policy, Congress did not encourage this relationship nor did it·
entirely abrogate the common law. 35 Practically speaking, the
preemption of state health care policy by ERISA is not designed to
maintain federal regulatory dominance of health care, but to pro-.
vide consistent and uniform regulation of the administration of
employee benefit plans. 36
In conclusion, the better governmental obligation for the regulation of health care under federalism is to recognize that federal
and state governments should share responsibilities for their citizens' health and welfare. However, state governments should
32. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 340-41; Ackerman, supra note 7, at 826 ~
29.
33. D.L. GIFFORD, & C.A. SELTZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF FLEXIBLE COMPENSATION
5 (1988). Gifford & Seltz describe the employers' rationale for gratuitously
granting employee health care and other benefits as follows:
The 1940s produced dramatic changes. High wartime taxes on
corporate income ... rekindled employer interest in the deductibility of
retirement plan contributj.ons. In addition, . . . wage stabilization
programs in place during World War Il(and later the Korean Conflict)
increased union receptivity to other forms of compensation provided by '
the employer-namely, fringe benefits. Later in the decade, court
decisions made pension and we,lfare benefits a matter for collective
bargaining. Finally, advances in medical technology not only increased
the efficacy of medical care but also raised the price, making it difficult
for individuals to afford the cost except on a group basis.
The result of these changes was a major shift in responsibility for '
security from the individual to the employer and widespread availability
of employee benefit coverage.
Id. at 5.
34. Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 909, 917 (1970); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Private Pension Plan:
Construction of Provision Authorizing Employer to Terminate or Modify Plan, 46
A.L.R.3d 464, 464 (1972 & Supp. 1993); Gifford & Seltz, supra note 33, at 5p;
David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 437-40 (1987).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (health care and other
welfare benefits do not vest under ERISA); see also infra notes 48-62 and
accompanying text.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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play the dominant role. Therefore, the federal law should allow,
and then assist, states in designing comprehensive state health
care policy.

3.

State Health Care Regulation

During the past three decades, states have enacted considerable regulation mandating health care and health-related benefits.
These regulations required benefits for drug and alcohol abuse,
job-related disability, and physical and mental health care. 37
Finding that health care was inaccessible to many of their citizens, many states proposed state health care programs. 38 These
programs require employers and others either to provide health
care benefits under employee benefit plans39 or to pass on health
care costs, through imposing a surcharge on patients' medical
bills, to employee benefit plans. 40 These plans provided employee
health care benefits and were ERISA regulated plans. 41 Thus,
these state programs were, in many instances, successfully challenged as preempted by section 1144(a) ofERISA.42 Nevertheless,
because of persistent problems involving health care, and increasing health care costs, effective health care policy still remains a
priority for many states,43 notwithstanding existing state medical
37. J . Ford, State-Mandated Employee Benefits: Conflict With Federal Law,
Apr. 1992, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 38. "States have enacted more than 700 laws
mandating provisions in healtl\.insurance plans ... since 1965." Id. at 38.
Several states have enacted legislation mandating treatment for alcohol and
drug abuse. Forty states have mandated treatment for alcohol abuse, while 22
states have mandated treatment for drug abuse. Much state health care benefit
legislation was enacted after the paSSEl,ge of The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Id. at 40.
38. Christine Woolsey, ERISA Used To Challenge State Health Laws , Bus.
INS., Sept. 28, 1992, at 1.
39. Ford, supra note 37, at 40; See infra notes 101-82 and accompanying text.
40. Woolsey, supra note 38, at 1 and 74.
41. 29 U.s.C. § 1002(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); See infra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
43. Jerry Geisel & M. Schacher, States Seize Reins of Health Care Reform,
Bus: INS., June 15, 1993, at 1. State legislative efforts to increase access to
health care are not new. Several states had passed comprehensive health care
programs that were subsequently preempted by ERISA. Ackerman, supra note
7, at 826 n .13; infra notes 112, 190, and accompanying text. Currently, several
states are pursuing a waiver to the ERISA preemption clause. In recent budget
legislation, a House committee agreed to extend waivers to Hawaii, Minnesota,
and New York Mark A. Hofmann, States Could Win Waivers of ERISA, Bus.
INS., May 17, 1993, at 1.
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assistance for the needy and indigent,44 voluntary state mandated-benefit regulation,45 federal medical care for the aged and
disabled,46 and national health care reform. 47 Finally, much state
health care law and public policy is directly affected by federal
labor and employment law.

C.

The Influence of Federal Employment Policy

As part of federal employment and labor regulation, ERISA
regulates the administration of employee welfare 48 and pension49
benefit plans. It requires employers and plan administrators to
comply with administrative requirements and provides substantive rights for employees. 5o It neither regulates the contents of
nor mandates employer-sponsored employee benefit plans. 51 Simply, in regulating plan administration and creating benefit plan
rights, it prevents employee benefit plan abuses. 52 ERISA mandates reporting and disclosure requirements, 53 funding, participation, and vesting requirements, 54 and fiduciary standards 55 in the
regulation of the administration of employee benefit plans. 56
ERISA grants employees, retirees, and their dependents the right
to bring claims against employers and plan administrators; thus
protecting rights and enforcing obligations owed under employee
welfare and pension benefit plans. 57 By imposing requirements
upon employers and relief for retirees and employees, ERISA
establishes a uniform and consistent framework for the regulation
of the administration of employee benefit plans.
To maintain uniform and consistent federal regulation, the
preemption clause of ERISA supersedes all state law that

A.

all .

44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396s (1988 & Supp. 1991).
45. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727-30
(1985); Ford, supra note 37, at 39-40.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396s (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
47. Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24;
Geisel, supra note 1, at 1.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
49. Id. at § 1002(2).
50. Id. at § 1051-61.
51. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
53 . Id. at §§ 1021-31.
54. Id. at §§ 1051-86.
55 . Id. at §§ 1101-14.
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
57 . Id. at § 1132(a)(1)(b).
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"relate[s] to" employee benefit plans,58 except for those laws
addressed in sections 1144(b)(2)59 and 1003(b)(3).60 The United
States Supreme Court has consistently given a broad interpretation to ERISA's preemption clause. 61 In some instances, this
interpretation allows federal courts to invalidate much state common law and public policy, for example health care law and
policy.62

II.

THE PREEMPTION CLAUSE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

Section 1144(a) of ERISA does not preempt all state law and
public policy. ERISA exempts certain state law and public policy
from preemption, but it still prohibits states from making law that
would either directly or indirectly regulate the contents of
employee benefit plans. The preemptive effects have broadly
invalidated many common law principles, legislative acts, and
public policy. In short, ERISA limits the regulation of employee
benefit plans by states, even though the state interest is a legitimate one, such as increasing accessibility to and paying for health
care.
A.

The Preemption Clause, Section 1144(a)

Section 1144(a) declares that ERISA "shall supersede any and
all state laws insofar as they ... relate to ... any employee benefit
plan ... ,"63 and thus pr.eempts a variety of state law, such as
health care, tort, employment, and contract law. 64 The complexity
of section 1144 and its express exemptions under sections 1144(b)
58. Id. at § 1144(a); Note, supra note 34, at 917.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
60. Id. at § 1003(b)(3). This section provides in pertinent part:
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any
employee benefit plan if(3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment
compensation or disability insurance laws.

471 U.S. 724, 727-30

" supra note 3, at 24;
Id.

61. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732; infra notes 85-98 and
accompanying text.
62. Infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). In construing "relate to," the
language of section 514(a), the Court gave "relate to" its ordinary meaning, "a
connection with or reference to." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97
(1983).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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and 1003(b) have resulted in considerable litigation determining
whether or not state law is preempted by ERISA. ERISA has preempted state laws that "provide an alternative cause of action to '
employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA, which refer specifically to ERISA plans and apply solely to them, or interfere with
the calculation of benefits owed to an employee."65 ERISA usually
has not preempted state common law and regulations that "are
laws of general application-often traditional exercises of state
power or regulatory authority- whose effect on ERISA plan~ is '
incidental."66 Thus the state law preempted by ERISA falls into
the two broa9. categories of traditional and nontraditional fields of
legitimate state interest.
,'
' ,Health care policy is a nontraditional, ' or perhaps a lesser,
area of state interest. But formulating health care policy at the
state level is not new. At the time of ERISA's enactment in 1974,
state comprehensive health care plans existed and others were
being designed. Admittedly, however, health care regulation is
not one of those traditional state functions that would be saved
from the ERISA preemption clause. 67 On the other hand, many
insurance, tort, contract, and employment regulations are traditional fields of state law. ERISA grants express exceptions for a
few traditional state functions from its coverage under section
1003(b)(3).68 In addition, ERISA provides for certain exemptions

I

B.

Secti
exception
exemptio'
ance reg1!
ings
"shall
of any
Under
to be

65. AETNA Life Ins. Co. v. Brn;ges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied., 493 U.S. 811 (1990).
66. See Borges, 869 F .2d at 146; see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
Federal courts have applied a multifactor test to determine whether or not'
ERISA "relate[sl to" and thus preempts state law. Van Camp v. AT&T, 963 F.2d
119, 122-123 (6th Cir. 1992); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's
Hosp ., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991) (list offactors to be considered
in determining whether or not general state law "relates to" ERISA plan); supra
note 140 and accompanying text.
67. Infra notes 110, 173, and accompanying text. The obligation of the states
to provide health care for their citizens is not resolved. See Parmet, supra note
22, at 267. In Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F . Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), the
district court found that health care regulation was a traditional function of state
government. The district court stated that:
Regulation of health insurance benefits available to workers is not a
function like "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation" which are "typical of those performed
by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of
administering the public law and furnishing public services."
Id. at 710 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976».
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); infra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text.
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B.

Statutory Exemptions and Exceptions to Preemption

Section 1144(a), the preemption clause, is limited by several
exceptions and exemptions. Section 1144(b) grants explicit
exemptions from section 1144(a) for banking, security, and insurance regulation. 70 Section 1144(b)(2)(A),71 which is actually a savings clause,72 provides, with one exception, that nothing in ERISA
"shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any state which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."73
Under this provision states cannot declare employee benefit plans
to be insurance or insurance-related and thus avoid preemption
under ERISA. In addition, section 1144(b)(2)(B),74 the deemer
clause,75 provides that no employee-benefit plan "shall be deemed
to be an insurance company or other insurer . .. or to be engaged
in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b); infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). This section provides in pertinent part:
(b) Construction and application. (1) This section shall not apply with
respect to any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which
occurred, before January 1, 1975.
(2)(A) Except as provided in..subparagraph (B), nothing in.this title
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
[d.
71. [d.
72. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 737-47.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 724.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). This section provides in pertinent part:
(b) Construction and application. (1) This section shall not apply with
respect to any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which
occurred, before January 1, 1975.
(2)(A) ...
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a), which is
not exempt under section 4(b) other than a plan established primarily
for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established
under any such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other ins}lrer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law
of any State purporting to regulated insurance companies, insurance
coritracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
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state purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance
contracts."76 ERISA does not preempt insurance regulation but
limits state power to declare employee benefit plans to be insurance indirectly regulating these plans. Next, section 1144(b)(4)
grants an exemption for state criminal law. 77 Finally, section
1144(b) of ERISA grants a limited exemption for the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Program. 78 Other states are requesting similar
exemptions, but Congress has shown no willingness to grant
them.79
ERISA also grants exceptions from its coverage. Exceptions
are granted for employee benefit plans of government,80 state
workers' compensation,81 state disability benefits,82 and employee
benefit plans of churches. 83 ERISA contains ·an exception for state
qualified domestic orders.84 These exceptions recognize fundamental state interests that are traditional functions in which
states exercise police and other powers. In essence, ERISA
preempts many state exercises of power, and only gives way to the
most fundamental of state interests. 85

C.

State Law and Preemption

ERISA has preempted much state common law and public
policy. Specifically, ERISA has preempted a state wrongful dis76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1.988 & Supp. III 1991).
77. [d. at § 1144(b)(4) (Subsection (a) shall not apply to any generally
applicable criminal law of a State).
78. Id. at 1144(b)(2)(5). This section provides:
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) shall
not apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw. Rev. Stat.
§§ 393-1 through 393-51).
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to exempt from
subsection (a)(i) any state tax law relating to employee benefit plans, or,
(ii) any amendment of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act enacted
after September 2, 1974, to the extent it provides for more than the
effective administration of such Act as in effect on such date.
Id. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
79. Hofmann, supra note 43, at 1.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
81. Id. § 1003(b)(3).
82.Id.
83. Id. § 1003(b)(2).
84. Id. § 1144(b)(7).
85. See David L. Gregory, ERISA Law in the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 945, 957-64 (1991).
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charge claim,86 an anti-subrogation law,87 a tort and contract law
claim,88 a common law insurance claim,89 and specific provisions
of workers' compensation acts. 90 The Court has held that ERISA
preempts state common law and statutory claims that "relate to"
employee benefit plans. Inductively, from the Court's holdings,
federal courts have concluded that preemption of state law occurs
where the state law provides claims that establish "an alternative
cause of action to employees to collect benefits protected by
ERISA, refers specifically to ERISA plans and applies solely to
them, or interferes with the calculation of benefits owed to an
employee."91 More succinctly, ERISA does not permit states to
directly or indirectly regulate employee benefit plans, except when
ERISA expressly grants exception to or exemption from
preemption.
Notwithstanding its expansive construction, the preemption
clause is neither absolute nor indiscriminate. 92 Under the Court's
interpretation of section 1144(a), it has held that ERISA does not
preempt state-mandated benefit regulation,93 crimina,llaw,94 severance pay at plant closings,95 and garnishment of ERISA welfare
benefit plans. 96 State common law and public policy which are not
preempted by ERISA are traditional areas in which states routinely exercise police and other powers,97 and thus have only "incidental effects" on ERISA regulated plans. 98 In conclusion, the
express exceptions and exemptions, along with the "incidental
effects" of traditional state pawer, do not save state health care
86. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
87. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
88. Pilot-Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
89. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
90. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992); See infra
notes 124-57 and accompanying text.
91. AETNA Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).
92. Gregory, supra note 85, at 958.
93. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
94. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
95. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
96. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
97. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727-30.
98. See Mackey, ' 486 U.S. at 830-38; See infra note 140 and accompanying
text.
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law and public policy from preemption under section 1144(a) of
ERISA.

III.

PREEMPTION AND STATE HEALTH CARE POLICY

Currently, states are recognizing that many of their citizens
do not have access to adequate health care. In addition, states are
feeling pressure to address deep concerns over the plight of uninsured and underinsured citizens. In attempting to respond to
these concerns, states are realizing that their ability to develop a
public policy with respect to health care is severely restrained by
ERISA. They are also finding that ERISA makes the state public
policy issue of health care more difficult to address. States are
finding that the broad interpretation of the ERISA preemption
clause, and the narrow interpretation of the exemption provisions,
stymie efforts to provide access to and pay for health care. 99 In
attempting to overcome these barriers, the reform of state health
care law and public policy has been achieved by several regulatory
means.
One of the means used by states is mandated-benefit regulation. Under mandateq.-benefits regulation, states require insurance companies to provide coverage for certain types of illness,
such as mental illness and substance abuse. 100 Becaus~ ERISA
neither directly mandates nor permits states to require employersponsored health car.e obligations, states ·are forced to indirectly
mandate health care benefits by hnposing benefit-related obligations on insurance companies which, in turn, means that employers will provide these health care benefits if they voluntarily
choose to purchase group health care insurance.lOl
Mandated-benefit regulation, however, does not resolve the
states' concerns over health care since it does not provide benefits
for the unemployed, indigent, and uninsurable. Because access to
health care is still needed, and voluntarily mandated-benefits regulation has proven inadequate,102 states have continued to try
more ingenious, indirect means of providing health care. · For
99. See supra notes 1 and 7 and accompanying text.
100. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 728-29.
101. See id. at 747-48.
102. Employees have no right to employee welfare benefits that . are
gratuitously provided by their employers. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732;
McGariri v. H.H. Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
482 (1992); Hamilton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1985).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/4

18

Holloway: ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Call f

[Vol. 16:405
section 1144(a) of

~ARE POLICY

ny of their citizens
addition, states are
the plight of uninting to respond to
ability to develop a
erely restrained by
\.es the state public
ddress. States are
ERISA preemption
:lmption provisions,
r health care. 99 In
orm of state health
T several regulatory
l.ted-benefit regulaates require in surin types of illness,
00 Becaus~ ERISA
[) require employerforced to indirectly
lefit-related obliganeans that employif they voluntarily
::e. 101
)es not resolve the
(lot provide benefits
. Because access to
ldated-benefits regTe continued to try
~ health care. For

are benefits that are
~ Life, 471 U.S. at 732;
, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
50 (8th Cir. 1985).

1994]

FEDERAL HEALTH CARE

423

example, states have enacted hospital surcharges and fees,103
health care continuation coverage,104 employee benefit-related
taxes,105 and hospital cost containment regulations. 106 Few of
these means, however, have survived preemption challenges
under the ERISA preemption clause.
To overcome the preemptive effects of ERISA, states have
asked Congress to amend the ERISA preemption clause. They
seek to obtain either a blanket exemption from preemption for
state health care law or a specific exemption for each state's
health care law. 107 In spite of the ERISA preemption clause,
states have , enacted comprehensive health care programs that
The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, would impose fiduciary
obligations on employers participating in regional and corporate health alliances.
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 78.
103. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
104. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
105. National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D.
Conn. 1978) (preempts state tax that is levied on benefits paid by employee
benefit plan); Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York
State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 569 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (preempts
state taxes on plan earnings). But see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser,
810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987) (does not preempt municipal income tax that is
assessed on employees). For a comment on the preemption of state tax law by
ERISA, see Kevin Matz, Note, ERISA's Preemption of State Tax Laws, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (1992).
For cases on the taxation of insurers, see generally .General Motors Corp. v.
California State Bd., 815 F.2d ~1305 (9th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 824 F .2d 816
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 941 (1988) (does not preempt state tax that
is assessed against insurers and calculated with reference to ERISA plans
because such state taxes are exempted under the savings clause); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Insurance Bureau, 399 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (does not
preempt state tax on gross revenues from insurance premiums).
106. See, e.g., Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.s. 1008 (1985) (ERISA does not preempt state law that prohibits benefit plans
from negotiating a discount with hospitals); but see infra notes 112-24 and
accompanying text. Later, Rebaldo was accorded limited weight in United Wire
Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F.
Supp. 524, 537 (D.N.J. 1992). However, its demise was premature. United Wire
Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d
1179, 1194 (3d Cir. 1993). In United Wire, the court of appeals found that "a
portion of the Rebaldo court's analysis remains persuasive," though other
portions did not survive Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 489 U.S. 133 (1990).
In distinguishing the two cases, the court of appeals stated that "it was the
absence of a direct nexus to ERISA plans and limited nature of the statute's
impact on such plans that put the pricing regulation in Rebaldo beyond the scope
of § 514 preemption." Id. at 1195.
107. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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consist of state-sponsored health care insurance as well as federal
and state subsidized medical assistance. An example of a comprehensive state health care program is the Oregon Basic Health Service Plan. 108
The comprehensive programs do not mandate employer-spon~
sored health care benefits which would be preempted by ERISA.
However, there is one exception to the preemption of employer
sponsored programs. The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act mandates employer-sponsored health care benefits. 109 The Hawaii
health care program is given a statutory exemption from preemption under section 1144(b)Yo Notwithstanding ingenious a:q.d
innovative means, most state health care law does not successfully survive preemption challenges. In many instances states
have been, and continue to be, plainly denied the right to "experi108. See generally, Eric Lamond Robinson, Note, The Oregon Basic Health
Care Services Act: A Model for State Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 977 (1992);
Kenneth K. Schmitt, Waiver quest: Oregon's Attempt to Re-Ration Health Care,
36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 947 (1992); Note, The Oregon Health Care Proposal and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 106 HAav. L. REV. 1296 (1993); W. John
Thomas, The Oregon Medicaid Proposal: Ethical Paralysis, Tragic Democracy,
and the Fate ofa Utilitarian Health Care Program, 72 OR. L. REV. 47 (1993). In
March 1993, the Clinton Administration approved the Oregon Plan by granting
Oregon the necessary Medicaid waiver. C. Connel, White House OKs Oregon
Health Plan, DAILY REFLECTOR, March 20, 1993, at Al.
109. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1974). Upon the enactment of
ERISA, Hawaii's health ca re program was preempted by ERISA. Standard Oil
Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F . Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.
1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). Later, Congress granted the Hawaii
Prepaid Health Care Act of 1974 an exemption from preemption under section
1144. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(AHb)(5)(C) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see ERISA:
Exemption from Preemption for Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act: Hearing on
H.R. 4046 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm.
on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
However, Congress did not exempt future amendments other than those
amendments to provide "for . . . effective administration." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii); see Council of Hawaii Hotels v. Agsalud, 594 F . Supp. 449 (D.
Haw. 1984). The district court found that ERISA preempted the 1978
Amendment to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act that required collectively
bargained health care plans to provide state mandated health care benefits. The
district court concluded that the 1978 amendment was exempted from
preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii) in that the 1978 amendment
provided for "more than the effective administration" of the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act that was in effect before September 2, 1974. Agsalud, 594 F.
Supp. at 453. For the pertinent language of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5), see supra
note 78:
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A)-(b)(5)(C) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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ment with novel legislation" to further their own public interests. 111 Hospital surcharges and fees are two such examples.

A. Hospital Surcharges and Fees: Preempted and Not
Preempted
A few states, either as part of a comprehensive health care
plan or as an effort to increase access to health care services, have
enacted statutes imposing hospital surcharges and fees on
patients' bills paid by commercial insurers or on services provided
by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).112 These surcharges and fees allow states to shift costs to ERISA regulated
employee benefit plans for both the insured and uninsured, the
costs resulting from increasing accessibility to health care for both
indigents and those who are employed but uninsured. 113
Several states have enacted hospital surcharges and fees.
State and federal courts have not agreed on whether or not ERISA
preempts all hospital surcharges and fees. First, New Jersey
enacted a state hospital reimbursement system that required selfinsured plans to pay in excess of actual charges, but this regulatory scheme was eventually held not to be preempted by
ERISA. 114 Second, Minnesota enacted the MinnesotaCare Pro111. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 829.
112. Woolsey, supra note 38, at 74. As of 1987, six states financed charity care
through a special add-on rate to hospital charges: Connecticut, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. Boblinski, supra note 1,
at 334 n.279, citing, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EmployerProvided Health Benefits: Legislative Initiatives, 62 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF 10
(1987» .
113. Sarah Lyall, Billing System For Hospitals Is Overturned: U.S. Ruling
Threatens Subsidies in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at B.1; ERISA Does
Not Preempt Hospital Surcharge, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., August 1993, at
75-76 (comment on United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund V.
Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524 (D.N.J. 1992), modified 995 F.2d
1179 (3d Cir. 1993».
i14. United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund V. Morristown
Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524, 537 (D.N.J. 1992), modified, 995 F.2d 1179
(3d Cir. 1993). New Jersey hospital rate setting scheme force self-insured plans
to pay in excess of actual charges. These plans had to pay: "costs of care for the
indigent, charges to pay a hospital's bad debts, subsidies for the medicare
program, and funds to reimburse hospitals for discounts given by the hospitals to
other types of benefit plans." United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare
Fund V. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524, 537 (D.N.J. 1992),
modified, 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993). The district court found that the New
Jersey statute would undermine the uniform and consistent regulation of the
administration of employee benefit plans. Id. at 537. Moreover, the court
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gram that "requires hospitals to pay a 2% tax on gross revenues to
help cover tJ;1e state's uninsured .... "115 The MinnesotaCare Program has been challenged by a self-insured plan as violating the
preemption clause of ERISA. 116 Third, New York enacted a state
health care provision that imposed a surcharge on hospital bills of
patients covered by commercial health insurers and HMOs.117
concluded that the New Jersey statute forces the benefit plans to "structure
themselves in a certain manner, and to pay hospital costs that accrue to nonbeneficiaries." Id.; see also, Bricklayers Local No.1 Welfare Fund v. Louisiana
Health Ins. Assoc., 771 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La. 1991). But the court of appeals did
not agree. It held that the New Jersey statute was not preempted by ERISA.
United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1196. The court of appeals stated that:
More importantly, there are many forms of state regulation under the
police power which result in increases in the cost of doing business and
corresponding increases in prices where the beneficiaries of the
regulation are not those who are paying the increased prices .... We are
confident, however, that ERISA was not intended to foreclose a state
regulation of this kind.
Id. Although New Jersey shifted the cost of health care to hospital by imposing
an added cost onto employee benefit plans, the court of appeals found this
exercise of police power, imposing a surcharge, to result only in an increase in the
cost of doing business. In turn, hospitals can pass health care cost forward to
employee benefit plans as an increase in the prices of health care services.
In United Wire, the court of appeals held that the New Jersey statute "do[es]
not constitute an unlawful taking of property without just compensation." Id. at
1190-91. See also, Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. at 540-42 (district
court holding-that statute did not constitute an unlawful taking). However, that
holding may not be th; 'last word on whether the regulation of health care costs
through controlling doctor's fees constitutes a regulatory taking, an interference
with property and economic rights. See Edward Felsenthal, AMA to Fight Limits
on Doctor's Fees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1993, at B7 (AMA report believes that
limits on doctor's fees could violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution).
115. Id.
116. MinnesotaCare's first phase, which was passed in 1992, "provides statesubsidized health insurance." MinnesotaCare is expected to cost $320 million by
1997 and to cover 320,000 uninsured citizens. M. Jordan, MinnesotaCare Health
Reform (Associated Press), DAILY REFLECTOR, May 24, 1993, at A4.
MinnesotaCare is funded by a "2% percent tax on gross receipts of health care
providers." Id. MinnesotaCare is not Minnesota's first effort to enact a
comprehensive health care program. An earlier Minnesota health care program
was also preempted by ERISA. See St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v.
Markman, 490 F . Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980).
117. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1992) amended
1993; See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F . Supp. 996, 999-1000 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Woolsey, supra note 38, at 1.
In Travelers Ins. Co., New York established a comprehensive scheme for the
regulation of inpatient hospital rates. These rates are "determined by the
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The N ew York surcharge was held by a federal district court to be
preempted by ERISA. 118 The insurers challenged the surcharge,
and the federal district court found that the 24% (combined 11%
and 13%) for commercial insur ers, and 9% for HMOs, shifted the
costs of health care to employee benefit plans and thus increased
plan costsy9 Additionally, the district court did not believe that
employee benefit plans should be forced to participate in a statutory scheme that "spread[s] the risk of high risk individuals
among a larger pool."120 Feder al courts are mixed on whether
state health care policy can impose fees or surcharges, either
directly or indirectly, on employee welfare benefit plans that evenpatient's diagnosis." Travelers Ins. Co. , 813 F. Supp. at 999. The diagnosis
governed the category or Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) the case is assigned.
New York Public Health law increased the DRG for inpatient services by 13%
Id. It imposed a surcharge on inpatient services for all patients covered by
commercial insurers. Id. It exempted Blue Cross and Blue Shield, health
maintenance organizations (HMO), and government plans. Id. Thus, patients
covered by commercial insurers would pay 113% of the DRG rate. On April 2,
1992, New York added another 11% surcharge on the DRG rate, which was
already 13%, for inpatient services covered by commercial insurers. Id. at 9991000. At the same time, it added a 9% surcharge on HMOs which previously had
been exempted from the surcharge. Id. at 1000. The Travelers Insurance
Company, and the New York State Health Maintenance Organization
Conference as an intervenor, challenged the New York Public Health Law as
preempted by ERISA. Id. at 999.
The district court found that the surcharge was not exempted from
preemption by the saving clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III
1991), and thus was preempted by ERISA. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F . Supp. at
1002. The surcharge was also not regulating "the business of insurance" under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act., 15 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988 & Supp. III 1191).
Travelers Ins. Co. , 813 F. Supp. at 1007. In addition, the court noted that the
statute imposing the surcharge referred to HMOs and self-insured benefit plans,
entities which the court stated "are not directly involved with the issuance of
insurance." Id. at 1008. For a discussion of the application of the McCarronFerguson Act, see infra note 161 and accompanying text .
118. Travelers Ins. Co. , 813 F. Supp. at 1003. See also , Lyall, supra note 113,
at Bl. Lyall reported that: "[hlealth-care experts say that yesterday's ruling
could put New York on the same path as New Jersey, which lost a similar
lawsuit last year and hastily had to patch together a new way of paying for
indigent care and setting hospital rates." Id. See also United Health Serv., Inc.
v. Upstate Admin. Serv., Inc., 573 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (state court
found that a similar New York hospital cost containment statute was preempted
by ERISA).
119. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1003; see also Lyall, supra note 113, at
Bl.
120. Travelers Inc. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1008; see also Lyall, supra note 113, at
B7.
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tually require insured and uninsured (self-funded) plans to "pay
for uncompensated . health care or to expand health-care
coverage. "121
In conclusion, states have sought to shift health care cost to
commercial insurers and HMOs that insure and provide services
for employees under employee benefit plans.122 The surcharges
and fees are more intrusive than mandated-benefits in that they
are mandatory and cover self-funded plans. 123 The preemption of
surcharges and other fees that "relate to" ERISA regulated plans,
restricts a "state's flexibility to devise ways to pay for care and
subsidize health care without insurance."124

Continuation of Health Care Coverage: Preempted
A few states mandate that employers who provide health care
coverage must continue to provide this coverage upon an occurrence that would cause a break in or termination of employment,
such as becoming eligible for family leave or receiving worker's
compensation benefits. This legislation, which is called health
care continuation coverage,125 has been challenged as being preempted by section 1144(a) of ERISA. An example of one such challenge is District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of
Trade. 126
.

B.

121. Woolsey, supra note 35, at 1; Lyall, supra note 113, at Bl. However, the
situation could even get worse, according to Lyall, in that:
The ruling [in Travelers Ins. Co.] does not in itself pull down the
state's hospital financing system, but it begins to chip away at it. In a
similar case pending in Federal Court in Brooklyn, a group of unions
have challenged a different state surcharge using the same ERISA
argument. In that case, the 5.5 percent is tacked on most hospital bills
and raises $1.1 billion a year that is used to subsidize health care for
people without insurance.
Lyall, supra note 113, at B7.
122. ld. at BI-B7.
123. ld.
124. ld. at B7.
125. See infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
126. 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992) (preempting District of Columbia regulation
requiring continuation of health care coverage); see also R.R. Donnelly & Son Co.
v. Prevost, 915 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1415 (1991) (does
not preempt Connecticut statute requiring continuation of health care coverage
in which statute was an exception to ERISA coverage under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991»; New Jersey Business & Indus. Ass'n v.
New Jersey, 592 A.2d 660 (N.J. Super. 1991) (preempting New Jersey Family
Leave Act that requires employers to continue health benefit plan for absent
employees during authorized period of family leave); but see Stone & Webster
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Greater Washington

In Greater Washington, the Cour t addressed an amendment
to the District of Columbia's Workers' Compensation Act which
provided for continuing health care benefits for employees eligible
for workers' compensation benefits. This amendment was called
the Workers' Compensation Equity Amendment Act (Equity
Amendment Act) of 1990. 127 In section 2(c)(2), the Equity Amendment Act imposes the following requirement:
Any employer who provides health insurance coverage for an
employee shall provide health insurance coverage equivalent to
the exiting health insurance coverage of the employee while the
employee receives or is eligible to receive workers' compensation
benefits under this chapter. 128

Section 2(c)(2) also mandated that employers provide health
insurance coverage for up to 52 weeks. Furthermore, this section
required employers to provide coverage "at the same benefit level
that the employee had at the time the employee received or was
eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits."129 In Greater
Washington, the Board of Trade sought to enjoin the enforcement
Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsly, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983)
(preempting a similar Connecticut statute requiring continuation coverage in
that statute did not relate to an exception under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3» .
The preemption of state law requiring continuation of health care coverage
has resulted in much professional commentary on the status of the law. See, e.g.,
Dean M. Werner, Group Heal th Coverage Continuation Requirement under
Federal and State Law, 64 WIS. LAW. 15 (1991); Rosalind Z. Wiggins & Thomas
Z. Reicher, ERISA Preemption of Connecticut Statutes Providing for
Continuation of Health Care Coverage, 64 CONN. B.J. 191 (1990); Theresa A.
Orlaske, Law Changes Affecting Employers' Health Care Continuation
Obligations, 69 MICH. B.J. 1158 (1990).
Federal health care continuation coverage law is provided in Title X of the
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. § 11611168 (1988 & Supp. 1993). COBRA does not require employers to provide health
care insurance; however, ifthey do provide this insurance, employers must allow
employees and/or their dependents to continue participation in the employer's
group health insurance plan upon termination of employment under certain
circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993); see M.S, Lapidus &
L.A. Erbs, Recent COBRA Developments in the Courts, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J .,
June 1992, at 1-13; 1992 Business Publications Research, COBRA Court Cases
Alert Employers to Compliance Pitfalls, MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND PERSONNEL
LAW, July 1, 1992, at 1-2; Werner, supra.
127. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307 (Supp. 1992).
128. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp. 1992); see Greater Washington,
113 S. Ct. at 582.
129. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(3) (Supp. 1992).
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of section 2(c)(2) by arguing that it was preempted by section
1144(a) of ERISA. The parties agreed that section 2(c)(2)
"relate[s] to" an ERISA-covered plan in the sense that the benefits
required under the challenged law "are set by reference to covered
employee benefit plans."13o "However, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that [section] 2(c)(2) was
not preempted because it also related to respondent's workers'
compensation plan, which is exempt from ERISA coverage .... "131
Furthermore, in faulty reliance on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. ,132 the district court also found that section 2(c)(2) was not
130. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 582-83.
131. [d. at 583. State workers' compensation acts are exempted from ERISA
coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
132. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). In Shaw, the New York Human Rights law, N.Y.
Exec. Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1982-83), prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sex. It also prohibited discrimination in employee
benefit plans, including discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. Shaw, 463
U.S. at 88. The New York Court of Appeals has held that a private employer
whose benefit plan treated pregnancy different from any other nonoccupational
disabilities engaged in sex discrimination. [d. (citing Brooklyn Union Gas-Co. v.
New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 359 N.E.2d 393 (1976)). In
contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court had recently held that discrimination based
upon pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (hereinafter Title VII). Shaw, 463 U.S. at
88 (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). In 1978, Congress
amended Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination based upon pregnancy.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)k (hereinafter PDA).
Prior to the PDA, the New York Human Rights law had a broader coverage than
Title VII. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88-89.
The New York Disability Benefits Law, N.Y. WORK COMPo LAw §§ 200-242
(McKinney 1965 and Supp. 1982-83), "require[d] employers to pay certain
benefits to employees I,mable to work because of nonoccupational injuries or
illness." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 89. The N.Y. Disability Benefits Law was amended
in August 1977, requiring employers to pay eight weeks of benefits for
pregnancy-related disabilities. Id. In 1981, the eight week pregnancy payment
provision was repealed, and the new provision requires employers to treat
pregnancy as any other disability. [d. at 90.
In Shaw, plaintiff-appellee Delta Air Lines and others provided medical and
disability benefits for their employees. Prior to the PDA, appellee's benefits plan
did not provide benefits to employees disabled by pregnancy as required by N.Y.
laws. Appellee filed the action alleging that the N.Y. Disability Benefits Law and
Human Rights Law were preempted by section 1144(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a). Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92.
The district court "held that Human Rights Law was preempted, insofar as it
required the provision of pregnancy benefits prior to the effective date of the
PDA." Shaw, 463 U.s. at 92-93. With respect to the Disability Benefits Law, the
district court concluded that these benefits were exempted under section
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preempted by ERISA "because [the Board of Trade] could comply
with § 2(c)(2) 'by creating a separate administrative unit to
administer the required benefit.' "133
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court judgment and held that section
2(c)(2) was preempted by ERISA,134 In reaching this decision, the
court of appeals held "[b]y tying the benefit levels of the workers'
compensation plan to those provided in an ERISA-covered plan,
that the Equity Amendment Act could have a serious impact on
the administration and content of the ERISA-covered plan."135
On review under a writ of certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' decision. 13G The Court granted certiorari because the decision of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals conflicted with the United States Court of Appeals for the
1003(b)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3), which exempts state disability law
from ERISA's coverage. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 93.
The court of appeals affirmed as to the Human Rights Law, but it remanded
the district court's finding on the preemption of Disability Benefits Law. It
concluded that the Disability Benefits Law was exempted from preemption so
long as the disability benefit plan, "as an integral unit," was maintained solely to
comply with a disability law. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 94-95 (citing Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. Kramarshy, 650 F.2d 1287, 1304 (1981». The court of appeals concluded
that if, on remand, the district court found that the disability was not a separate
administrative unit, it would be preempted by ERISA. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95.
On review, the Court held "that the Human Rights Law and the Disability
Benefits Law 'relate to any employee benefit plans' within the meaning of"
section 1144(a) of ERISA. [d. at 100. In construing the "relate to" language of
section 1144(a), the Court gave the language its ordinary meaning, "connection
with or reference to." [d. at 97. In its construction, the Court reviewed the
legislative history of section 1144(a), further justifying its broad interpretation.
With respect to whether section 1144(a) preempted state disability law, the
Court held that it did not. The Court held "that the Disability Benefits Law is
not preempted by ERISA," although the state permits employers to comply with
its disability law by including disability benefits in their employee benefit plans.
[d. at 109. However, the Court stated New York can enforce its disability benefit
plan, although it is part of a multibenefit ERISA plan. [d. at 108. The Court
stated that to enforce its disability benefit plan, New York could not regulate the
contents of ERISA covered plans. [d. at 109.
The Court also held "that New York's Human Rights Law is not preempted
with respect to ERISA benefit plans only insofar as it prohibits practices that
were lawful under federal law ...." [d. at 108.
133. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108).
134. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1317
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
.
135. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583.
136. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 580.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

27

l'
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4

[VoL 16:405

1994

Second Circuit's decision in R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. v.
Prevost .137 In R.R. Donnelly, the Second Circuit "upheld against a
preemption challenge a Connecticut law substantially similar to
[section] 2(c)(2)."138
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2.

«Relate[s] to" an ERISA Plan: Exempted from Preemption

In the Greater Washington, the United States Supreme Court
restated an earlier conclusion that a law "related to" an ERISA
covered employee benefit plan for purposes of section 1144(a), "ifit
has a connection with or reference to such a plan."139 The Court
also noted that such a law is preempted by ERISA if it is not
exempted by section 1003(b)(3). Finally, the Court stated the law
is still preempted even if the effect was not intended, was indirect,
or was consistent with ERISA requirements. 140 The Court then
held that "section 2(c)(2) of the Equity Amendment Act specifically

graIli
Imp~

ERI~!

from1
1003

COUI,

1144

ERn

did j
plan:
for t;
1003

137. 915 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991).
138. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583.
139. Id. (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U.S. 133, 138 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S.
825, 829 (1988)).
140. Id. at 583. The court stated specifically that:
Under [Section] 514(a), ERISA preempts any state law that refers
to or has a connection with covered benefit plans (and that does not fall
within a § 514(b) exception) "even if the law is not specifically designed
to affect such plans, or the affect is only indirect," Ingersoll-Rand, [ ] 498 .
U.S. at 139, . . . and even if the law is "consistent with ERISA's
substantive requirements."
Id. (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739). In a footnote, the Court observed
that [p]reemption does not occur, however, if state law has only a "tenuous,
remote, peripheral" connection with covered plans, as is the case with many laws
of general applicability. Id. at 583 n.1 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.s. at 100 n. 21) . .
Other lower federal courts have noted that the exercise of traditional state
authority is among the criteria to be considered by courts in deciding whether a
state law is "remote, tenuous, and peripheral." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 1987); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869
F.2d 142, 146 (2nd Cir. 1989). In Neusser, the Sixth Circuit provided a list of
factors to be considered in deciding whether state law falls within the "remote
and tenuous" exception to section 1144. Neusser, 810 F.2d at 555. These factors
include: (1) whether the state law represents a traditional exercise of state
authority; (2) whether the benefit plan affects relations among employer, plan,
fiduciaries and beneficiaries rather than relations between one of these entities
and an outside party or between two outside parties, and (3) whether law's effect .
on ERISA plan is incidental. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F .2d
at 555-56. In Borges, the court of appeals noted that indirect economic impact
did constitute incidental impact and that any effect on structure, administration,
and contents of these plans is not incidental. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869
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refers to welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA and, on that
basis alone, is preempted."141 The Court reasoned that health
care coverage required by section 2(c)(2) "is measured by reference
to 'existing health insurance coverage' pr ovided by the employer
and "shall be at the same benefit level."142 The Court found that
an "employee's existing health care coverage 143 .. . is a welfare
benefit plan ... ," that "employer-sponsored health insurance programs are subject to ERISA regulation," and that "any state law
imposing requirements by reference to covered plans must yield to
ERISA"
Section 2(c)(2) of the Equity Amendment Act was not saved
from preemption by the exception granted under section
1003(b)(3)144 of ERISA for state worker's compensation. 145 The
Court stated that this statutory exception did not restrict section
1144(a) once it is found that state regulation "relate[s] to" an
ERISA covered plan.146 The Court also stated that section 2(c)(2)
did not relate directly to a statutorily exempted welfare benefit
plan, i.e., workers' compensation, and was not "maintained solely
for the purpose of complying with" state law exempted by section
1003(b)(3) of ERISA147
In holding that section 2(c)(2) of the Equity Amendment Act
was exempted from preemption, the District Court relied on Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 148 The Supreme Court did not find the
District Court's reasoning persuasive. In Shaw, the Court held
that a New York disability insurance law was exempted under
section 1003(b)(3) and thus was not preempted by ERISA149 Furthermore, the Court found that the disability law did not "relate
to" an ERISA covered plan because it was administered through a
F .2d at 146; see also, Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
141. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583.
142. Id. at 583-84 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-307(a-1)(1) & (3) (Supp.
1992)).
143. Id. at 584.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
145. Greater Washington, at 584-85.
146. Id. at 584 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525
(1981) · ("it is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly through a
workers' compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called
'pension regulation.' ")).
147. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584.
148. 436 U.S. ·85, 94-95 (1983).
149. Shaw, 463 U.s. at 108.
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multibenefit ERISA plan. 150 Based on this holding, the Greater
Washington Court concluded that Shaw could not support the
District Court's argument that .section 2(c)(2) was exempted by
section 1003(b)(3) of ERISA.151 The Court emphatically stated
that once state law "relate[sl to" an ERISA covered plan, it is not
automatically saved by exemption under section 1003(b)(3), even
though it could be administered as a separate, non-ERISA plan
under section 1003(b)(3).152 Greater Washington is most explicit:
if state continuation of health care coverage regulations "relate[sl
to" an ERISA covered plan, it is not saved by exemption from preemption under section 1003(b)(3) of ERISA because it is administered under a workers' compensation plan. Thus any state health
care law which would extend coverage to an uninsured who would
be gainfully employed but for an accident in the course of employment, would be invalidated by an expansive interpretation of
ERISA's preemption clause.

C.

Mandated-Benefits Regulation: Not Preempted
Although the interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause
has been expansive, the clause does not preempt all health care
policy that "relate[sl to" ERISA-covered plans. For example,
states establish and implement health care policy through insurance regulations which mandate health care benefits, such as
mental health, drug and alcohol abuse, and disability, under
group health care insurance contracts. 153 The Court per;mitted
states to indirectly regulate employee benefit plans in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts .154
1. Metropolitan Life
In Metropolitan Life, the Court addressed Massachusetts
General Statute chapter 175, section 47B,155 which "requires that
specified minimum mental-health-care benefits be provided [tol a
150. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 107; see supra note 80-85 . .
151. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584.
.
152. [d.
153. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 746-47.
154. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
155. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 1985) (hereinafter
Section 47B). The commonwealth required that,
any general health-insurance policy that provides hospital and surgical
coverage, or any benefit plan that has such coverage, to provide as well a
certain minimum of mental health protection.
[d.
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Massachusetts resident who is insured under a general insur ance
policy, an accident or sickness insurance policy, or an employee
health-care plan that covers hospital and surgical expenses."156
The purpose of section 4 7:a was to address "problems encountered
in treating mental illness" by providing more effective t reatment
in the private community.157
In Metropolitan Life, the Court concluded that Section 47B
was a mandated-benefit statute "that regulate[s] the subst antive
contents of health-insurance policies to further state health care
policy."158 The Court observed that mandated-benefit statutes,
regulating the terms of insurance contracts, were quite common
among the states. 159 Moreover, the Court observed that states
had long regulated insurance contracts. 160 In addition, the Court
observed "that the McCarran-Ferguson Act,161 also strongly supports the conclusion that regulation regarding the substantive
156.
157.
158.
159.

Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727.
[d. at 730-31.
[d. at 729.
[d. at 728-29.
160. [d. at 727~30 n.2-10, 742 n.18-19.
161. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The McCarr an-Ferguson
Act was a legislative response to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), in which the Court held that insurance was interstate
commerce and subject to antitrust law. See United States Dep't of Treasury v.
Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202, 2207 (1993) (Ohio law to liquidate insurance is, in part,
"regulating the business of insurance. ").
In Metropolitan Life, the Court stated that "federal law should not be
construed to supersede state ' laws 'regulating the business of insurance.' ''
Metropolitan Life , 471 U.S. at 736. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b». The Court also
observed that the McCarran-Ferguson Act "ensure[s] that the States would
continue to have the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance." [d. at
744 (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217-18
(1979)b. See also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pierno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) (three
prong test to determine what constitutes the business of insurance); SEC v.
National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (emphasis on the relationship between
insurers and insured). Based upon the similarity in the language of McCarranFerguson Act and the saving clause, the Court concluded that the saving clause
was designed to preserve the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Metropolitan Life, 471
U.S. at 744.
The Court also noted that McCarran-Ferguson Act had been interpreted in
other cases to mean that the regulation of the substantive terms of insurance
contracts is "regulating the business of insurance." [d. at 742-43. These cases
have established three criteria to determine whether a practice or activity falls
within the "business of insurance." .The Court stated that:
[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder's risk, second, whether the practice is an integral part of
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terms of insurance contracts falls squarely within the saving
clause (exempted from preemption) as laws "which regulate insurance."162 The Court found that even though mandated-benefit
statutes required insured employers to provide minimum level
and kinds of benefits, they were nevertheless regulation of the
business of insurance. 163 The Court then found that Section 47B
was a mandated-benefit law and thus a regulation of the business
of insurance. 164 However, it agreed with the Massachusetts Judicial Court that the Massachusetts statute "as applied relates to
ERISA plans and thus is covered by ERISA's broad preemption
provision set forth in [section] 1144(a)."165

2.

section

"Relate{s} to" an ERISA Plan: Exempted from Preemption

In Metropolitan Life, the Court noted that the preemption
clause in section 1144(a) is limited by the insurance saving clause,
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third,
whether the practice is limited to entities with the insurance industry.
ld. at 743 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pierno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
The Court then applied the three criteria to section 47B and concluded that
mandated-benefit laws are state regulation of the "business of insurance." ld. at
757.
162. Metropolitan Life , 417 U.S. at 742-43.
163. ld. at 743. In Metropolitan Life, defendants-appellants Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. and Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) issued group health
policies to employers who employed....Massachusetts residents. Under section 47B
appellants were required to provide mental health benefits under policies issued
to cover Massachusetts residents. However, believing they were not bound by
section 47B, the appellants did not provide such benefits. The Attorney General
sought enforcement of Section 47B by 'd eclaratory and injunctive relief. In
granting the injunction, the superior court stated that the appellants refused to
provide the benefits because they believed that section 47B was preempted by
ERISA. ld. at 734-35.
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. Attorney
General v. Travelers Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 1223 (Mass. 1982). The Court agreed
that section 47B relates to .an ERISA covered employee benefit plan.
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739. It then considered whether the insurance
exemption under section 1144(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A),
would exempt section 47B from preemption. The Court concluded that section
47B is saved from preemption by section 1144(b)(2)(A) which exempts insurance
contracts from preemption. ld. at 745-46. The Court held that "Massachusetts'
mandated-benefit law is a 'law which regulates insurance' and so is not
preempted by ERISA as it applies to insurance contracts purchased for plans
subject to ERISA." ld. at 758.
164. Metropolitan Life, 417 U.S. at 742-43.
165. ld. at 739.
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section 1144(b)(2)(A),166 which "preserves any state law which
regulates insurance."167 The Court concluded that the Massachusetts statute, requiring mandated-mental health benefits, was
exempted from pre-emption by the insurance saving clause. 168
The Court reached its conclusion based on its interpretation of the
language of the saving clause. 169 The Court found that the language of section 1144(a) was inconsistent with the language of section 1144(b)(2)(A) in that section 1144(a) preempts state law, but
section 1144(b)(2)(A) permits states to make insurance law. It
then accepted the assumption "that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."170 The
Court then concluded that the "plain language of the saving
clause, its relationship to the other ERISA pre-emption provisions, and the traditional understanding of insurance regulation"
lead to one conclusion: section 1144(b)(2)(B), the deemer clause,
exempts from the saving clause state insurance law that indirectly regulates welfare benefit plans. l71 Stated another way, the
Court concluded that Congress intended to exempt insurance law
that did not directly regulate employee benefit plans. 172 Thus, the
saving clause exempts traditional state regulation of insurance
166. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
167. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-43.
168. [d. at 746.
169. [d. at 744 .
170. [d. at 740.
171. [d. at 744-45 .
172. [d. at 741; see also Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Union
v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir.1985) (does not preempt state insurance
regulation requiring substance abuse treatment); Maryland v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 463 A.2d 793 (Md. 1983) (does not preempt state insurance regulation
that requires reimbursement of social worker services); Blue Cross Hosp. Serv.,
Inc. v. Frappier, 698 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1985) (does not preempt state insurance
regulation that mandates chiropractic and psychological services). But see, e.g.,
Insurance Bd. Under Social Ins. Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir, 819 F.2d
408 (3d Cir. 1987) (preempts state laws that regulate contents of employee
health care benefit plans); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary,
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (preempts state law that regulates
reimbursement for prescription drugs); Council of Hawaii Hotels v. Agsalud, 594
F. Supp. 449 (D. Haw. 1984) (preempts 1978 amendments to Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act of 1974 that regulates collectively bargained employee health
care benefit plans); Wayne Chern. Inc. v. Columbus Agency Servo Corp., 426 F.
Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 197'1), modified on other grounds, 567 F .2d 692 (7th Cir.
1978) (preempts state insurance law that prohibits the termination of dependent
coverage under employee benefit plan); General Split Corp. V. Mitchell, 523 F .
Supp. 427 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (preempts state law that mandates conversion
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that does not regulate employee benefit plans, though it "relate[s]
to" ERISA-covered plans. 173
The Court noted that its decision did not apply to uninsured
or self-funded welfare benefit plans. 174 As a result, the Massachusetts statute affects only employee benefit plans that are covered
or insured by commercial insurance contracts. ERISA does not,
under section 1144(a) and its exemptions, permit direct regulation
of employee benefit plans by states. 175 However it allows indirect
regulation when it is imposed under an insurance regulation that
does not mandate the contents of employee benefit plans. 176 Mandated-benefit regulation is actually voluntary in that employers
are not required to purchase group health insurance. In sum,
after Greater Washington and Metropolitan Life, it is well settled
that ERISA invalidates much state health care policy that
"relate[s] to any employee benefit plans," and leaves few regulatory means for states to implement effective health care policy.l77
IV. ERISA, FEDERALISM, AND HEALTH CARE POLICY
Section 1144(a) is highly restrictive of state health care law
and public policy, except for narrowly drawn exemptions provided
in sections 1144(b) and 1003(b)(3). Greater Washington, Metropolitan Life and Shaw clearly show that ERISA implements federal
employment and labor policies mostly for administrative purposes. Ironically, these policies preempt much state health care
law and public policy, and:thus constitutionally affect the exercise
of state powers under the federal system. 178 However, the worst
may be yet too come.
benefits and establishes risk-sharing plans). Ford, supra note 37, discusses
mandated-benefit statutes enacted by the states after the enactment of ERISA.
173. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 745-46. The Court found that Congress
intended for the states to regulate the business of insurance. Id. at 736-37;
supra note 158-165 and accompanying text.
174. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747. See generally Jonathan Goldstein,
Note, ERISA's Deemer Clause and the Question of Self-Insureds: What's a State
To Do? 67 WASH. u. L.Q. 291, 291-303 (1989).
175. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747.
176. Id.
177. See generally supra notes 109, 172, and accompanying text (discussing the
statutory exemption that Congress granted the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care
Program (hereinafter Hawaii Prepaid Program». The Hawaii Prepaid Program
had been preempted by the section 1144(a) of ERISA.
178. ERISA preemption frustrates the financing of state health care reforms in
that states cannot shift the cost of health care to employers unless they deCide to
purchase group health care insurance. Still states can only affect those
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ERISA is a legislative scheme that demonstrates the need for
uniformity and consistency in implementing a comprehensive, federal regulatory framework for certain fields of law, namely
employment and labor, that were once gove:med by state common
law and public policy. Eventually, federal health care policy could
be as comprehensive. Such a policy could require uniformity and
<;!onsistency in implementing it among the fifty states and thus
require the preemption of much state health care law and public
policy.179 Although it furthers a significant public interest, federal health care regulation still raises substantial concerns that
are worth considering in regard to its ultimate effect on the scope
of federalism.
A.

ERISA and Its Impact on State Health Care Policy

Section 1144(a) of ERISA limits state health care policy even
though sections 1003(b)(3) and 1144(b)(2)(A) grant exemptions
from preemption. Those exemptions do not give states the flexibility to broadly formulate health care policy for their citizens,
.unless Congress grants an explicit exemption for each state's program. 180 For example, states cannot mandate the continuation of
health care coverage in conjunction with employee absences created by their receiving workers' compensation, disability benefits,
or family leave. 181 Therefore, states are severely restricted in
designing health care regulation to increase access to and pay for
health care for unemployed, uninsured individuals.
employers who can afford to and do purchase groups health insurance. The selffunded employers are out of reach. Under the Court's holding in Metropolitan
Lile, mandated-benefit statutes do not apply to self-funded or uninsured
employers. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747. As previously stated,
section 1144(a) preempts taxes on employee benefit plans, supra note 105, and
surcharges and fees on commercial insurers, supra notes 112-24. Furthermore,
section 1144(a) flatly prohibits employer-sponsored benefits and thus states must
rely on incentives to induce employer participation in state health care plans.
Boblinski, supra note 1, at 335. It is believed that voluntary health care
programs are not effective. Id. at 337.
The financing of any state reforms could be totally preempted if the federal
government mandates new taxes or fees to finance a national health care
program. Therefore, any state health care reform must be closely coordinated
with, governed by federal guidelines, and financed by the federal government or
exceptions it grants. Infra notes 212, 222, and accompanying text.
179. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 345.
180. Supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
181. See Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584-85 .
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Expansive Interpretations Impose Severe Limits on State
Health Care Policy

In Greater Washington, the Court made it quite clear that if
state law "relate[s] to" ERISA-covered welfare benefit plans, it is
preempted, even though it is exempted under section
1003(b)(3).182 The Court found that the continuation of health
care coverage is a too-direct regulation of ERISA-covered plans,
even though this coverage made sure that health care coverage
was accessible to workers who may not easily qualify for or immediately find employment with health care coverage. 183 Although
the continuation of health care coverage maintains access to
health care insurance, the Court was not compelled to create an
exception to ERISA.
Earlier, in Metropolitan Life , the Court permitted indirect
regulation of employee benefit plans through mandated-benefits
imposed under group health care insurance contracts. 184 The
Court did not allow the states to affect the contents of or mandate
employee benefit plans. 185 Even mandated-benefits regulation
must stay within the limits of the saving clause, section
1144(b)(2)(A), and if this regulation is found to be an ERISA-covered plan, it is preempted under the dee mer clause of section
1144(b)(2)(B).186 Furthermore, mandated-benefit regulation does
182. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584-85.
183. [d. at 587-88 (Stevens7'J., dissenting). In arguing that the Court ignored
the purpose of District of Columbia's continuation coverage and over-interpreted
the "relate to" language, the dissent maintained:
The statute at issue in this case does not regulate any ERISA plan
or require any ERISA plan administrator to make any changes in the
administration of such a plan .... Moreover, by requiring an injured
worker's compensation to reflect his entire pay package, the statute
attempts to replace fully the lost earning power of every injured
employee.
[d. at 587 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). The dissent believed that the Court applied a
mechanical test and never really considered the disfavor of preempting state law
and the specific concerns of Congress. [d. at 588.
184. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747.
185. [d.
186. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 980 (1978) (state law cannot subject employee benefit plan to state
insurance regulation or make this plan insurance); St. Paul Elec. Workers
Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980) (state
comprehensive health care act "relates to" employee welfare benefit plans).
The interpretation of the deemer clause by federal courts has resulted in
much praise and criticism. See, e.g. , J .K. Swedback, Note, The Deemer Clause: A
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not apply to self-funded insurance plans. 187 However, even
though the Court permitted states to enact insurance regulation
to implement health care policy, it held such regulation shall not
regulate the contents of employee benefit plans or apply to selfLegislative Savior for Self-Funded Health Insurance Plans Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 757 (1992);
Goldstein, supra note 174 (analyzing Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United
of Wis., 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988), in which the court of appeals held that "the
deemer clause of ERISA preempts state law claims against self-insured employee
benefit plans.").
187. Federal courts have held that 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) preempts state common
law and insurance regulation that applies to self-funded plans. See, e.g. ,
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 471 U.S. at 738 (decision does not apply to self-funded
plans); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (preempts state insurance law
that regulates self-insured welfare benefit plan); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (preempts state law that
allow claims against self-funded plans); United Food & Commercial Workers &
Employers Ariz. Health & Welfare Trust v. Paeyza, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986)
(preempts state insurance law that establishes reimbursement requirements for
self-funded plan); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.
1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978)
(preempts state comprehensive health plan that relates to employee benefit
plans); Cuttle v. Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, 623 F. Supp. 1154 (D.
Me. 1985) (preempts state insurance conversion law that might apply to self
funded plans).
The protection that ERISA gives to self-funded plans may be short lived.
The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, imposes stringent requirements on
self-funded health care benefit plans. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at
79-80. The Health Security Proposal sets "financial reserve requirements for
self-funded health benefit plans." President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 79.
These requirements are as follows:
New requirements for financial reserves apply to self-funded health
plans. Self-funded health plans establish a trust fund that is
maintained at a level equal to estimated amount that the plan owes
providers at any given time. The plan pays claims from the trust fund.
Trust funds are protected by special status in bankruptcy proceedings if
the sponsoring employer fails.
Reserve requirements may be met through letters of credit, bonds or
other appropriate security rather than establishing the trust fund .
A new national guaranty fund for self-funded health plans provides
financial protection for health providers in case of financial failure of a
plan. The Department of Labor oversees the national quaranty fund; it
operates in a manner similar to state insurance guaranty funds.
The Department of Labor may inspect the books and records of selffunded health plans and assume control over plans if they fail to meet
reserve requirements. Health benefit plans notify the Department of
Labor if they fail to meet requirements.
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 79-80.
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funded employee benefit plans. 188 Under the Court's holdings in
Greater Washington and Metropolitan Life, not much state health
care law and public policy will actually survive challenges under
section 1144(a).

B.

ERISA and a Reduction in States' Rights

Preemption is compelled when it is explicit in the language of
the statute. 189 As ERISA expressly preempts state law, state
health care policy must give way to federal employment and labor
regulation. But labor and employment regulation have not traditionally governed medical 'c are and assistance. As a part of this
regulation, ERISA establishes a uniform and consistent regulatory framework for the administration of employee benefit plans,
not for the regulation of medical care. The employment purpose is
valid, but its effect on medical care is either too political or too
legal.

States' Dependency on Federal and Private Interests
Permitting ERISA to affect uniformity in health care policy
among the states exceeds the bounds of cooperative government
relations. Rather than permitting the interaction of the labor
market and state public policy to set a minimum standard of
health care benefits, ERISA retains an employer's common law
discretion to withhold health care benefits. ERISA decreases the
influence that state public--' policy has on local employees and
1.

188. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 738.
189. [d. at 738. The Court has made it abundantly clear that:
In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is
to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue.
"Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose .... "
[d. In addition, the Court has other more settled principles that should be
considered in deciding whether state law and public policy is preempted:
Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause "start[s]
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress. Accordingly, "'[t]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone" , of pre-emption analysis.
Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 587 n.4 (Stevens, J ., dissenting) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,103
(1963)). Nevertheless, ERISA invalidates much state public policy, legislation,
and common law.
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employee-related decisions. Consequently, the labor market that
is influenced by global competition is the primary, or at least the
most significant, determinant of local health care needs and services. Under the Court's interpretation of ERISA, local communities are more likely, when compared with the past, to lose health
care benefits first and jobs second as the result of the diminished
influence of local public policy. According to this interpretation,
ERISA severely restricts the implementation of a flexible, comprehensive state health care policy. Matters are made worse by federal legislative reticence on health care reform.
Unlike the federal government, states have reformed health
care. For example, state health care reform consists of federally
subsidized Medicaid,190 state-sponsored health insurance,191 and
mandated-benefits of insurance contracts. 192 Still, many states
find themselves in a precarious position when they implement
their programs. Existing state health care policy that furthers
legitimate health care needs depends mostly on voluntary gratuities by employers and federal subsidies. 193 State health care
reform depends on the following factors: (1) whether employers
will voluntarily grant health care benefits under self-funded
plans;194 (2) whether employers will voluntarily purchase commercial insurance subject to mandated-benefits regulation;195
(3) whether the federal government will grant an exemption from
or exception to section 1144(a);196 and (4) whether the federal government will continue to subsidize medical care and assistance

190. See generally Robinson, supra note 108, at 977-1013 (extending health
care to Oregon citizens under federally subsidized Medicaid, voluntarily granted
employer mandated-benefits, and state-sponsored insurance); supra notes 28-32,
108, and accompanying text.
191. Robinson, supra note 108, at 977-1013.
192. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 729-31.
193. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 729-31; 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3)
(exceptions for worker's compensation and disability benefit laws). In
Metropolitan Life, the Court noted Massachusetts' rationale and purposes for
implementing a mandated-benefit statute requiring that mental health benefits
be given in group health insurance policies. Id.
194. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747; supra notes 109, 172, and
accompanying text.
195. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 746-47; supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
196. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-47; supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
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programs. 197 Employers' gratuities and federal subsidies do not
fall within the "reserved powers" of the states and thus states lack
the power to enforce most health care regulation. State financing
must be taken from already recession-weakened and deficit-laden
coffers. Therefore, state health care policy is precariously dependent on the whims of deficit-ridden federal and cost-conscious private interests that are not within the control of the states' public
policy mechanisms.

2. Raising More Fundamental Constitution Concerns
The ERISA preemption clause raises other more fundamental
issues, namely the existing scope of federalism under the United
States Constitution. Much debate has been raised regarding the
preemptive effects of ERISA on state law (other than insurance
regulation) that mandates the contents of employee welfare benefit plans. 198 ERISA eliminates substantive protection for employees who were once protected under state common law and public
policy.199 The lack of protection for employee interests is exacerbated by the states' inability to intervene in employer decisions to
unilaterally terminate or modify health care and other benefits.
In enacting ERISA, Congress, relying on the Commerce 200 and
197. See Robinson, supra note 108, at 977-1013 (extending health care to
Oregon citizens under federally subsidized Medicaid); supra notes 28-32, 108,
and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Laura J. Bond, Note, ERISA-Preemption-Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux: Congress's Cue to Reassess ERISA's Preemptive Effect, 36 KAN.
L. REV. 611 (1988); Robert I. Lorio, Note, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon: State
Actions for Wrongful Employment Discharge Subject to ERISA Preemption, 37
Loy. L. REV. 375 (1991); Boblinski, supra note 1; David L. Gregory, The Scope of
ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study on Effective Federalism, 48 U. PI'IT. L.
REV. 427 (1987); James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of
State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978); Peter H. Turza & Lorraine Hollaway, Preemption of State
Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974,28 CAUl. U . L. REV.
163, 169-74 (1974); Ackerman, supra note 7, at 825.
199. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991); supra notes 48-57 and
accompanying text. ERISA also requires federal courts to develop federal
common law contract and trust to construe employee benefit plans. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-12 (1989) (citing, Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); see also, Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983). "A body of
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Id. at
24 n.26 (quoting, 129 Congo Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits».
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Supremacy Clauses,201 sought and established uniformity and
consistency in employee benefit policies. Congress did not intend
to affect States' abilities to formulate local public policy or to
strengthen states' rights for employee benefits, notwithstanding
the explicit reservation of power under the Tenth Amendment of
the Constitution. 202
V.

Concerns

FEDERAL HEALTH CARE

LESSER FEDERALISM OR MORE FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE

To lessen the preemption of state health care policy and to
preserve states' rights to affect public policy, amending the ERISA
preemption clause is not the answer. Amending the preemption
clause will not entirely eliminate federal-state conflict regarding
the preemption of state health care law and public policy. This is
because federal policy-makers may preempt even more state
health care and other law and public policy by establishing a comprehensive national health care program. 203 A comprehensive
national health care policy would have to deal with interrelated
social, economic, and political issues in order to address essential
health care and health care related standards. Namely, such a
policy would need to accomplish several or all of the following
goals: (1) make health care more accessible; (2) reduce or limit
health care costs; (3) provide medical malpractice reform; (4) eliminate duplicate state health care and health-care related programs; and (5) pay for the increased use of health care services. 204
A comprehensive federal health care legislation that establishes a
201. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
202. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see generally Gregory, supra note 34, at 429;
Boblinski, supra note 1, at 258 (discussing ERISA's impact on federalism under
the labor preemption doctrine). In Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F .
Supp. 695 (1977), the district court stated that: "By preempting state health
insurance laws, Congress did not violate the limits placed by the Tenth
Amendment on its authority under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 710. Relying
on the National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the district court
concluded that ERISA regulates business affairs, namely employment
relationships and "does not impair any essential attribute of state soverei.gnty."
Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. at 710. For comments on whether federalism has political
or legal substance under the Constitution, see generally H. Jefferson Powell, The
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (discussing the
prudential grounds for a rule of law protecting federalism under the U.S.
Constitution).
203. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 344-45.
204. See, e.g., Boblinski, supra note 1, at 260-68, Ackerman, supra note 7, at
826-830; President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 3-4.
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uniform and consistent policy would potentially preempt more
state law than ERISA.
A.

Impact of National Health Care Policy

Why would such a federal law need to be so Draconian? To
further legitimate federal interests among the states, a comprehensive federal health care regulation would eventually preempt
parts or all of state law and public policy in the following fields:
(1) hospital and health care institution regulation;205 (2) insur205. Health care providers and others .have challenged state hospital
surcharges, fees, and other regulations under section 1144(a) ·o f E~ISA. Supra
notes 112-24 and accompanying text. In not preempting hospital surcharges,
ERISA permits states to ·shift health care cost to commercial insurers and
employers. Supra notes 114-26. A federally provided and financed health care
program would make it difficult for states' citizens, who are required to pay a
health care tax, to finance additional local and state health care needs. See
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 52. Under the Health Security
Proposal, "[s]tates can not regulate premium rates changed by health plans,
except when necessary to meet budget requirements or to ensure plan solvency."
Id. at 55-56. Although states may provide benefits beyond those required by the
Health Security Proposal, they can not use revenues from the Health Security
Proposal to provide additional benefits. Id. at 56. In addition, they cannot "rely
on a payroll mandate on employers or another revenue source applicable solely to
corporations or payroll." Id.
Finally, a comprehensive-federal comprehensive health care proposal, such
as the Health Security Proposal, would more likely eliminate state hospital
surcharges and fees that are imposed on patients' bills as these bills would then
be paid by funds collected and distributed under a national health care program.
And remaining state fees could be so burdensome that hospital and other
organizations may not be able to pay them. Furthermore, comprehensive federal
health care would eventually subject hospitals and other health care institutions
to more federal regulation, either directly or indirectly. See Ron Winslow,
Medical Industry Scrambles To Keep Up With Changes , WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
1993, at A7.
Under the Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, the federal government
will regulate health care institutions in streamlining regulations. For example,
the Health Security Proposal states that:
Minimum Standards for Health Care Institutions. The National
Quality management Program develops uniform standards for licensing
of health care institutions that focus on essential performance
requirements related to patient care. As those standards are developed,
those standards replace current standards ...
Id. at 118-19. Thus, the Health Security Proposal and similar proposals would
make existing state regulation and public policy invalid as the federal
government creates a uniform and consistent health care institution standards.
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ance regulation;206 (3) common law tort, contract, and employment;207 (4) worker's compensation acts;208 (5) disability benefits
206. The federal regulation of insurance contracts to increase accessibility to
health care would necessarily preempt much state insurance statutes and
common law as insurance is regulated by the state. See Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727-29 (1985). Such preemption could also
undermine much health care-related benefits that are provided under mandatedbenefit statutes of insurance regulation. See Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3,
at 1 & 45; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24.
The Health Security Proposal would drastically change state health
insurance regulation. Many health insurers would be affected by the Health
Security Proposal as health insurance as we know it today would be drastically
scaled back. Winslow, supra note 205, at A7. Health plans, insurers, or any
other persons may not offer a supplemental insurance policy that duplicates the
benefits of the comprehensive package. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at
89-90. Supplemental insurance can be used to cover both cost sharing and
additional health benefits. It can cover all or some of benefits not included in the
comprehensive package. Id. at 88. Not all supplemental policies must abide by
the rules for insurance; e.g., medigap insurance and insurance against accidents.
Id. The specifics of the Health Security Proposal provide:
The National Health Board develops two standard, supplemental
cost-sharing policies. One model provides standard coverage; the other
maximum coverage.
SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE
Supplemental insurance to cover both cost sharing and additional
health benefits is allowed.
A supplemental benefit policy may cover all or some portion of
benefits not included in the comprehensive package, such as long-term
rehabilitation services and cosmetic surgery. A policy covering cost
sharing might pay a portion of co-payments and co-insurance required
by a health plan.
Any entity that offers supplemental policies must abide by the rules
for supplemental insurance. However, the following types of insurance
policies are not subject to these rules:
* Long-term care insurance
* Insurance against specific diseases
* Hospital or nursing home indemnity insurance
* Medigap insurance
* Insurance against accidents.
Id. at 88. In addition, the Health Security Proposal would repeal the antitrust
exemption given to health insurance companies. This would eliminate the ability
of the health plan, as insurers, to "collectively determine the rates they charge
. ... " Id. at 195. In short, there will be a smaller health insurance industry and
less state authority to regulate it.
207. As a comprehensive regulatory scheme, ERISA has had, and is still
having, a broad impact on employer-employee relations, as well as other state
common law and public policy. In comparison, a comprehensive national health
care program could have similar effects on the employment and other contractual
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relationships that arise between the health care delivery system and the public.
Thus, a comprehensive health care system may be equally as intrusive as
ERISA. It is reasonable to infer that national health care will affect parts of
contract (doctor-patient), tort (medical malpractice), and employment (employeremployee). See Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1 & 45; Fletcher, supra
note 3, at 24.
ERISA has preempted much state common law and related public policy to
maintain a uniform and consistent regulatory scheme for the administration of
employee benefit plans. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)
(preempts state wrongful discharge claim); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41 (1987) (preempts state common law fraud in the inducement);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor; 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (preempts state common
law insurance claim). The Court's expansive interpretation of ERISA does not
permit state tort, contract, or insurance laws "that provide an alternative cause
of action to employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA .... " AETNA Life
Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811
(1990); supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. ERISA's preemption of much
state common law has generated much scholarly commentary. See supra note
198 and accompanying text. The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, shows
how a comprehensive health care plan could eventually affect state common law
and public policy. For example, the Health Security Proposal increases employer
responsibility for employee welfare benefits. It requires the employer to share
health care costs with the employee. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at
17-18. It also requires "[e]mployers whose primary occupation is employee
leasing ... to participate in regional Health alliances regardless of the number of
employees." Id. at 21. "The term employer is defined as it is under the ERISA
statute." Id. Finally, "The Department of Labor regulates employers ... " in
corporate alliances. Id. .at 72. It is entirely unreasonable to expect a
comprehensive federal. health care plan to have a lesser effect on state common
law and public policy of employment and other fields of law.
208. Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1-45; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24.
Section 1003(b)(3) of ERISA exempts state worker's compensation acts from
preemption, but it may not"be the same under a comprehensive federal health
care program. Commentators, policy analysts, and others are worried about the
impact of a national health care program on state worker's compensation.
Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 45; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24. It is
urged that "coverage for injured workers' medical care," be shifted to a national
health care program. Id. Some believe that the shift is a foregone conclusion,
while others have cautioned the current Federal Administration not to forget the
purpose of workers' compensation: "overall workplace disability management
system that focuses on maximum medical improvement and prompt return to
work." Id. Implementing worker's compensation under a comprehensive federal
health care program requires coordinating- probably through creating uniform
and consistent workers' compensation laws-federal and state laws. Hofmann &
Fletcher, supra note 3, 'at 45. This would required the preemption .o f state
workers' compensation law. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24.
Commentators and others were not entirely wrong. In actuality, the Health
Security Proposal, supra note 5, would preempt state workers' compensation law
regulating the choice of health care "provider for workers' compensation cases of
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law;209 (6) automobile liability insurance law;210 (7) medical malpractice law;211 and (8) special exemption from preemption under
Section 1144.212 Such expansive and massive preemption,
whether immediate or gradual, means that preemption under a
individuals covered through health alliances." President Health Plan, supra
note 5, at 98. However, the Health Security Proposal presently does not preempt
other workers' compensation regulation. [d. at 99. "Health benefits for workrelated injuries and illness continue to be defined by states." [d. But recognizing
the existing federal dominance in the field of health care, federal preemption of
state law and public policy tends to be even more expansive. Federal preemption
may give the States healthy citizens but perhaps a sick government, preemption
that causes morbid federalism.
209. See supra note 208.
210. See supra note 208; Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1. The Health
Security Proposal, supra note 5, requires automobile insurers to "reimburse ...
the health plan for services provided." President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at
101. The Health Security Proposal does not preempt the much state liability
insurance other than that insurance law covering the choice of providers. [d.
211. A federal health care program could become as preemptive as ERISA. To
maintain uniform and consistent access to health care, many state common law
claims will be preempted by federal health care regulation, or the federal
program will become a patch work of uncoordinated state schemes that lack the
consistency and uniformity intended by the federal scheme. See Boblinski, supra
note 1, at 345.
For that reason and others, many health care reformers see a reform of
medical malpractice law as a part of a national health care program. See
Woolsey, supra note 1, at 20-25. It is strongly believed that the current Federal
Administration's proposal Includes provisions for reforming medical malpractice
laws. These provisions "will discourage frivolous suits and encourage greater use
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms." J. Geisel, Employer Mandate Key
to Financing, Bus. INS., May 17, 1993, at 144.
That thinking is correct. The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, does
attempt to reform medical malpractice. The Health Security Proposal reforms
medical malpractice law by proposing changes in tort and alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 189. Its
proposed changes are as follows: (1) creation of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, (2) requirement for certificate of merit, (3) limits on attorney fees,
(4) repeat offenders, (5) collateral services, (6) periodic payment of awards,
(7) enterprise liability demonstration project, and (8) standards based on practice
guidelines. [d. at 189-91. Unless states are exempted from the requirements of
a comprehensive federal health care program, much state common law will be
preempted as the federal program seeks to maintain uniformity and consistency
in the exclusive federal scheme.
212. Supra note 205 and accompanying text. The Health Security Proposal,
supra note 5, modifies the preemption provision of ERISA. It states that:
The ERISA preemption provision is modified to:
*. Apply the preemption only with respect to employers and health
benefit plans in corporate alliances.
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comprehensive federal health care regulation would only start
where ERISA left off. This may explain Congress' reservation in
not amending ERISA. By not giving the states exemptions from
and exceptions to preemption for local health care plans,213 Congress avoids repealing ERISA amendments that would be inconsistent with highly comprehensive federal health care. 214
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Broad Preemptive Effects of Comprehensive Health Care

Comprehensive federal health care would have some broad
preemptive effects in many fields of regulation. For example, a
regulation governing the health care insurance industry could
impliedly, if not expressly, preempt states from uSIng the mandated-benefit statute as a voluntary means of establishing access
to health care benefits for employed, retired, and disabled workers. Obviously, state mandated-benefits that are impose under
insurance contracts would either be preempted or incorporated
into the national health care program. In any event, states lose
some of their authority over the insurance industry by not having
the power to make broad based mandated-benefit statutes. Moreover, strengthening the ERISA prohibition against employersponsored health care benefits would continue to deny all states,
except Hawaii,215 ali alternative means to affect local and state
public policy. But permitting the federal government to impose
employer-based health care taxes that are not designed specifically to support health care needs of the local population requires
local employers to support health care for the general population

B.

* Permit taxes and assessments . on employers or health benefit
plans in corporate alliances if the assessments are nondiscriminatory in
nature.
* Permit states to develop all-payer hospital rates or all-payer rate '
setting.
* States also may require all payers, including health benefit plans
in corporate alliances, to reimburse essential community providers.
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 80. Note that the Health Security
Proposal permits "taxes and assessments employers or health benefit plans in
corporate alliances." Id. at 80. States can also develop all-payer hospital rates or
all-payer rate setting. Id. The Health Security Proposal would provide some
relief for states, but they would still be subject to new federal regulations.
213. Infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. '
214. It is believed that a national health care program should make it easier
for states to enact new and maintain health care reforms. See Geisel, supra note
211, at 44. .
215. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/4

supra I
217. I
218. I
first pri
states'
219.

46

Holloway: ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Call f

[V01. 16:405

would only start
~ss' reservation in
. exemptions from
are plans,213 Con.t would be incon;h care. 214

sive Health Care
have some broad
L. For example, a
ce industry could
n using the manstablishing access
nd disabled workare impose under
d or incorporated
event, states lose
stry by not having
3.tstatutes. MoreIgainst employerto deny all states,
!ct local and state
rnment to impose
t designed specifiopulation requires
~eneral population
or health benefit
:J.discriminatory in
s or all-payer rate
~alth benefit plans
nity providers.
t the Health Security
lealth benefit plans in
·payer hospital rates or
11 would provide some
:feral regulations.

should make it easier
See Geisel, supra note

1994]

FEDERAL HEALTH CARE

451

rather than for local employees and their families. 216 As a result,
states are denied the ability to redistribute wealth to support local
economic growth and social progress. Under such a program,
states will lose the power to affect local public policy.
A comprehensive national health care policy will be more preemptive than ERISA because in providing a minimum standard
and some uniformity, it will have to control health care and health
care-related interests which are intertwined with numerous fields
of state law and public policy. This will result in the undermining
of federalism.

B.

Comprehensive Health Care in the Spirit of Federalism

The time has passed for Congress to relieve states of the preemptive effects of federal labor and employment law on state
health care policy. At this time, amending ERISA would only confuse sincere federal efforts to design a national health care program. 217 Furthermore, any federal health care policy must
preempt considerable state law or exempt from preemption state
health care policy that complies with or exceeds minimum federal
health care standards. The latter alternative considerably preserves federalism by giving the states responsibility for their own
welfare 218 and not enlarging federal health care powers where
exclusive federal power may not necessarily exist. 219 A coordinated state-federal health care policy is the preferred long-term
216. But see President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 52-53; supra note 5 and
accompanying text. To avoid the full scale redistribution of wealth across the
nation, the Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, establishes a local-national
arrangement through creating corporate and regional health alliances. States
establish and govern the regional health alliances. President's Health Plan,
supra note 5, at 60-80.
217. Boblinski, supra note 1, at 343-46.
218. Infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. States do not necessarily give
first priority to legitimate social interests when they are unpopular with the
states' citizens. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 344-45.
219. Parmet, supra note 22, at 319-30; Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48;
Rivkin, supra note 22, at A19. Expansive preemptive provisions that control
employer-employee relations, personal injury law, insurance suits, and workrelated claims threaten to create a uniform system of federal common law which
would supplant much state common law and public policy. This expands the
interpretive powers of federal courts but leaves them without much state public
policy. In regard to the making of federal common law, many health care issues
are broad based social questions that federal courts should not decide, such as
the duration, frequency, amount, and quality of health care for specific illnesses.
National health care is a complex, state and federal public policy problem. See
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strategy. In the short-term, as a stop gap measure, a limited
exemption from preemption under ERISA of federally recognized
comprehensive state health care programs is suitable. 220
1.

Maintaining ((Cooperative Federalism" In Comprehensive
Health Care

Notwithstanding long-running state reluctance to redistribute wealth and pursue broad social welfare interests,221 if states
are constantly subjected to federal authority that provides essential human needs for their citizens, they may lose their faith in
democracy.222 . Whether Hamiltonian · or Jeffersonian federalism,223 state interests that economically encourage employment in
communities that permit unhealthy labor do not invest in their
human resources. These state interests are characteristic of the
dawn of the industrial age, not the dawn of the information age.
For that reason, a national health care policy should start with an
adamant stand by the federal government that the nation will
Boblinski, supra note 1, at 345-48. It is not precedent for federal courts to tread
where fools dare not to go.
220. Boblinski, supra note 1, finds that a comprehensive national health care
program is the better alternative. Id. at 346. She finds that an ERISA waiver
would not be entirely effective in that some states may feel that employermandated health care beneE,ts make them less attractive. Furthermore,
Congress may be reluctant to grant such a waiver. Id. at 344-45.
221. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 270-71; Thompson, supra note 22, at 648.
222. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 270-71. Many commentators, policy
analysts, and others argue that "poorer, less industrialized states" may not be
able to formulate effective health care programs. Kenny & Sullivan, supra note
1, at 44. They argue that this reason justifies exclusive federal control of health
care. But it should not. It justifies federal policy and financial assistance. If the
United States does not reduce the cost of health care, it could be a poor, deficit
ridden, service state and thus, it could not establis!J. health care for anyone.
223. Gregory, supra note 34, at 429. Gregory describes the thinking on the
federal-state relationship during the framing of the Constitution:
Alexander IJamilton advocated a strong federal government. He feared
that the forum of national government originally proposed at the
Convention was not sufficiently powerful and lobbied to broaden its
authority ... .
Thomas Jefferson and the anti-Federalist Republicans, on the other
hand, believed that a powerful national government would inevitably
lead to an irresponsible, corrupt and expensive bureaucratic
government.
Id. at 439.
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have coordinated local-national health care and that states shall
administer and pay for much of it.224

2.

Governmental Participation In Comprehensive Health
Care
Under local-national health care sharing responsibility, the
federal government should participate with authority, as opposed
to exclusive control, in establishing minimum health care needs
and reasonable cost controls for health care services. 225 Federal
participation should not greatly exceed federal-state relations that
were created in establishing medical services, controlling costs,
and insuring quality under Medicaid and Medicare. Moreover,
Medicaid should be fully integrated into a coordinated localnational health care program. Small and large businesses should
not be permitted to externalize (to Medicaid and other programs)
the costs of health care for uninsured, employed, low-income
workers, and nonworkers if these businesses are subject to
employer-sponsored health care programs. Most significantly, the
federal government must provide some funds to provide health
care for the insurable and uninsured persons. The federal role
should be to facilitate and coordinate but not exclusively govern
the health care systems of the states.
3. The Quintessential Constitutional Concerns
In local-national health care regulation, states must accept
and impose greater health care responsibilities on their businesses, local governments, and citizens. Unfortunately, states
224. Kenny & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 41 & 44; Keefe, supra note 7, at 40;
Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48. Under the Health Security Proposal, it is
intended that governmental responsibility for the administration of the health
care system be shared by the federal and state governments. President's Health
Plan, supra note 5, at 52-53. The Health Security Proposal states that:
States assume primary responsibility for ensuring that all eligible
individuals have access to a health plan that delivers the nationally
guaranteed comprehensive benefit package.
Id. at 52-53. However, the ' states are generally permitted in limited
circumstances to levy taxes or assess fees to pay for health care needs of their
citizens, though the ERISA preemption will be modified. Id. at 80.
225. Kenny & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 43. Similar components of major
health care proposals are as follows: "[(1)] [a] uniform benefit packages,
[(2)] [a]ccountable health care plans that compete at the .local level[, and (3)]
public sponsorships of individuals and small employers. Id. at 43. The Health
Security Proposal contains similar components. See President's Health Plan,
supra note 5, at 3-4.
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have been reluctant to do this. 226 . As a starting point, states need
to make equitable social welfare regulation. Next, they need to
establish medical services that are equal to or consistent with federally proposed benefit packages. Finally, they need to establish
and maintain access to and control of local health care costs.
Several reasons support states' acceptance of greater health
care responsibilities. First, states already regulate doctors,
nurses, hospitals, and insurers. 227 Second, ~tates know local
social and economic conditions and thus can· design health care
plans to fit local communities, such as municipalities and counties. 228 Third, states have gained conf;liderable fiscal knowledge
and experience in regulating health care costs under Medicare
and Medicaid. 229 They have also attempted to implement comprehensive health care programs. Finally, since states provide much
of the health care and medical education, they can use their education systems to educate their citizens and businesses. In preserving federalism by insuring greater participation and authority
for states in making health care law and public policy, the quintessential questions are: (1) whether the states are willing to
accept more responsibility for health care; and (2) whether the
federal government is willing to give up some of its health care
authority.230 Presently, neither appears willing to share this
responsibility and thus federalism falters.
-. VI.

CONCLUSION

ERISA has a negative impact on state health care law and
public policy. Its exceptions to coverage and exemptions from preemption do not give the states enough flexibility to design and
implement state health care reform unless the federal government
grants prior approval for employer-sponsored benefits or grants
funds for medical assistance programs. The federal-state relationship regarding state health care policy reflects the almost total
dependence of the states on federal regulation. This dependence
signals a decline in federalism. This decline could be accelerated
by the formulation and eventual implementation of a comprehensive federal health care policy that, when compared with the com226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48.
Supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
But see Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48.
See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
See Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48.
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prehensive regulation of employee benefit plans, could preempt
more state law and public policy than ERISA. 231
Despite this decline, federalism can still be strengthened.
First, the federal government needs to establish a minimum standard of health care. Second, federal employee benefit policy needs
to exempt from preemption state health care law and policy under
certain conditions. When a state comprehensive health care program complies with federal cost, access and quality requirements,
and insures an equitable distribution of medical care among a
state's citizens, it should be recognized and supported by the federal government. 232 However, in the long-term, state-federal coordination and the sharing of health care responsibilities through a
local-national health care plan is the ultimate solution. 233 Federal
regulation that preempts (i.e. ignores) local and state public policy
.furthers the decline of coordinated government needed for "cooperative federalism"234 in a complex, maturing society. Such inept
constitutional wisdom leads to complex policy problems that eventually mature into strategic failures.

231. Supra notes 217 -20 and accompanying text; see Rivkin, supra note 22, at
A19.
232. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
233. Keefe, supra note 7, at 44.
234. Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.s.
1008 (1985) (ERISA does not preempt state law that regulates hospital fees.);
supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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